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ecent financial turmoil has provided added salience to the long-
simmering debate about the intellectual cogency of securities 
regulation.1  The goal of the regulatory regime is investor protection 
and the primary mode of regulation is mandated disclosure.2  But the 
link between mission and means has never been clear.3  This 
ambiguity calls into question the legitimacy of our regulatory 
structure and makes it difficult to arrive at convincing rationales for 
reform efforts.  In this Article, I seek to address this ambiguity by 
proposing a new way to view securities regulation—one that situates 
the regulations in a broader theoretical and institutional context.  I 
then use this new perspective as a basis on which to both comment on 
traditional reform proposals and offer new ones. 
Specifically, I argue that securities regulation is best viewed as part 
of a larger societal framework that serves to protect individuals from 
stock market risk.  I contend that management of market risk is a 
valid societal goal; that securities regulation is one component of a 
societal risk-management structure that has never been identified as 
such; and that we can improve upon this structure, not by pursuing 
traditional avenues of securities law reform, but by restructuring the 
institutional framework through which investors participate in the 
stock market. 
This conception of securities regulation is both an extension of and 
a response to the modern law-and-economics narrative about how our 
current regime protects investors.  The law-and-economics account is 
that investors are protected by the integrity of market prices, and that 
mandated disclosures help to assure such integrity.4  According to the 
 
1 For an excellent review of this debate, see LOUIS LOSS ET AL., 1 SECURITIES 
REGULATION 257–325 (4th ed. 2006). 
2 See infra Part I.A. 
3 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at 263–65.  Securities regulation covers a range of 
investments, including debt instruments, but the focus of this Article is on securities 
regulation as it pertains to publicly traded equity. 
4 What I refer to as the “law-and-economics” account stems from mainstream economic 
analysis.  Some economists, however, would likely have a different take.  For instance, as 
R
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efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), security prices rationally and 
immediately reflect all available information (including disclosures 
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)).5  
Therefore, when investors purchase a security, they are protected in 
the sense that they are paying the right price.6  SEC-mandated 
disclosures are important in that they are part of what allow prices to 
achieve this high level of accuracy.7 
The above reasoning is the closest thing we have today to a 
justificatory theory of securities regulation.  But this popular and 
intuitive notion is unsatisfying because it fails to explain exactly why 
accurate stock prices offer meaningful investor protection.  
Intuitively, accurate prices would seem to provide some safeguard 
against poor decisions and, in a certain sense, they seem fair.  A 
closer inspection reveals, however, that they do little, if anything, to 
protect investors from making suboptimal investment choices.8  Nor 
are they any fairer than stock prices that are random and irrational.9  
In its present form, therefore, our modern notion of how securities 
regulation contributes to investor protection lacks intellectual 
purchase. 
We can better understand the role of securities regulation if we 
shift our focus to market risk.  In finance, risk is synonymous with 
volatility.  The notion that protection from volatility benefits investors 
rests on much sounder footing.  Leading works of political philosophy 
by John Rawls, whose ideas are based on notions of fairness, and 
John Harsanyi, whose ideas are grounded in utilitarianism, 
contemplate a role for government in protecting individuals from 
chance.10  Because stock market volatility is one instance where 
chance enters people’s lives, it is one instance where, under both 
Rawls’s and Harsanyi’s logic, government intervention is potentially 
beneficial. 
 
discussed infra Part I.A, some may argue that the market would function just fine without 
disclosure. 
5 See infra Parts I.A., II.B.1.a. 
6 See infra Part I.A.  As discussed infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text, according 
to EMH, stock prices are right, not in an absolute sense, but in that they represent society’s 
best guess based on available information. 
7 See infra Part I.A. 
8 See infra Part I.B. 
9 See infra Part I.B. 
10 See infra Part II.A. 
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This can also be put more tangibly.  The stock market is the 
primary mechanism through which individuals save for retirement.11  
Its gyrations over time, therefore, significantly impact the financial 
well-being of millions of individuals.  Some investors do well, others 
do poorly, depending on market vacillations while they are in it.  
Intuitively, however, it seems both unjust and inefficient that chance 
rewards some and punishes others.  It would seem to make sense, 
therefore, for the government to seek to provide investors shelter from 
such arbitrariness.  Rawls’s and Harsanyi’s works are consistent with 
this intuition.  By applying their logic to this area, we have more 
rigorous support for the notion that government intervention to shield 
investors from market risk would provide meaningful protection. 
In fact, we have a structure for providing this protection already in 
place, though its various elements have never been conceptualized as 
making up a unified risk-management framework.  Theoretically, 
there are two compatible ways the government can help investors 
manage market risk: the first is to endeavor to make the market itself 
less volatile; the second is to set up or foster institutions that help 
investors control their exposure to the market, however volatile it may 
be.  The way we currently deal with market risk can be organized 
according to these two prongs. 
Securities regulation fits into this paradigm as an endogenous 
mechanism for making the market itself less volatile.  Theoretical and 
empirical works suggest that disclosures make stock prices more 
accurate; more accurate stock prices evidence less volatility.12  While 
EMH suggests that mandated disclosures feed into a market process 
that yields share prices that are actually correct (and where volatility 
 
11 See PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, A 
NATIONAL SURVEY AMONG STOCK INVESTORS, 5 (Jan. 1997) (conducting a survey of 
investors showing that eighty-nine percent were invested in the stock market for retirement 
purposes).  More generally, as discussed infra Part III.B.3, defined contribution plans, 
such as 401(k)s, provide the main source of retirement savings for most Americans.  
Approximately two-thirds of 401(k) assets are in equities.  401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, 
Account Balances, and Loan Activity in 2007, RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE (Investment 
Company Institute, D.C.), Dec. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per14          
-03.pdf.; see also ALICIA H. MUNNELL & DAN MULDOON, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, 
ARE RETIREMENT SAVINGS TOO EXPOSED TO MARKET RISK? 2 tbl.1 (2008) (estimating 
that as of October 2008, individuals held $2.7 trillion in equities as part of their retirement 
savings accounts). 
12 See infra Part II.B.  This Article focuses on disclosure as a force for reducing 
volatility.  It is worth noting, however, that other aspects of securities regulation, such as 
the recently adopted short-selling restrictions and stock-exchange circuit breakers, 
arguably reduce volatility as well.  See Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-61595, 75 Fed. Reg. 11232 (Mar. 10, 2010); see also infra note 267. 
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has therefore been minimized), I argue that we should embrace a 
more modest account.13  Behavioral finance scholarship has shown 
that the notion that share prices are correct rests on shaky theoretical 
and empirical underpinnings.  Meanwhile, considerations regarding 
the epistemology of finance and the financial influence of so-called 
fat-tail events14 call into question whether prices are or can be 
accurate in any meaningful sense of the word.  Based on all of this, it 
seems that, while we can legitimately claim that securities regulation 
helps make stock prices more accurate and therefore less volatile, we 
should omit any declaration that share prices are actually right. 
Despite the contribution that securities regulation makes to relative 
stock-price accuracy, however, much volatility remains in the 
market.15  Such volatility can be addressed exogenously.  Today, 
rather than set up governmental institutions to help investors control 
their exposure to risk, we foster a mutual fund marketplace that gives 
individuals the opportunity to manage volatility on their own.  The 
expectation is that by investing in mutual funds for the long term and 
by diversifying their portfolios, individuals can choose the extent to 
which they are exposed to the market’s swings. 
It is questionable, however, how much protection this relatively 
hands-off approach actually provides.16  Contrary to popular opinion, 
long-term investing is not proven to lessen volatility.  Portfolio 
diversification, while it does reduce risk, is both limited and difficult 
for ordinary investors to master.  These shortcomings in the 
mechanisms that are available and in the abilities of ordinary 
investors mean that it is unlikely that people are effectively managing 
the significant amount of volatility that securities regulation leaves 
behind. 
I argue, therefore, that we should think about reform proposals 
with the potential to make it easier for investors to shield themselves 
from volatility without overly compromising returns.17  One avenue 
would be to reform securities regulation.  It is alluring to think that 
more or better regulation would lead to improved accuracy and 
reduced volatility without dousing market returns.  I contend, 
however, that reforms along these lines offer limited potential because 
 
13 See infra Part II.B. 
14 This term is defined and discussed infra notes 251–258 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra Part II.C. 
16 See infra Part II.C. 
17 See infra Part III. 
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remaining stock-price inaccuracy stems from barriers related to the 
structure of the market, the incentives of market actors, and bounded 
cognition.  Those are all problems that securities rules are ill equipped 
to effectively confront. 
On the other hand, I argue that we can potentially do a great deal of 
good through reforms targeted outside of the market.18  I consider 
three different approaches.  The first works largely within the existing 
paradigm, where investors are expected to manage and bear market 
risk on their own.  I look at how to improve portfolio-diversification 
options and guide individuals toward good investing decisions.  After 
that, I consider mechanisms that represent a more dramatic departure 
from today’s framework in that they contemplate risk sharing through 
governmental or private institutions.  Specifically, I look at the 
potential for private-sector companies or the government to insure 
market returns and consider various mechanisms that link retirement 
savings to lifetime earnings rather than to market performance.  I 
contend that while the option that builds on our existing template is 
alluringly incrementalist, the latter alternatives have the potential to 
much more fully insulate investors from market swings, and they are, 
therefore, worth a serious look. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  In the first, I argue that we 
lack a satisfactory theory about how securities regulation protects 
investors.  I focus on the lack of a sound intellectual foundation for 
the modern notion that it is accurate share prices, which come about 
thanks in part to SEC-mandated disclosures, that provide protection.  
In the next Part, I describe a new theory for how to conceptualize 
securities regulation.  I argue that we can rationalize our regulatory 
framework if we look at it as part of a larger societal risk-
management system.  I first discuss why protection from risk is a 
valid societal goal; then, I outline what securities regulation 
contributes to this endeavor (I focus on whether EMH should 
continue to inform our understanding of securities regulation even 
under this new framework); and last, I look at the exogenous 
mechanisms available to investors for managing market risk.  In the 
final Part of this Article, I analyze the normative implications of this 
analysis.  I argue that today’s risk-management framework does not 
do enough to help investors and consider several avenues of reform. 
 
18 See infra Part III.B. 
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I 
SECURITIES REGULATION AND INVESTOR PROTECTION 
A.  Theories of Investor Protection 
Since its inception, investor protection has been the central goal of 
securities regulation.  In the year of its enactment, William O. 
Douglas and George E. Bates stated in the Yale Law Journal that 
investor protection was the “fundamental purpose” of the Securities 
Act of 1933.19  The SEC has repeatedly called investor protection the 
“basic purpose” of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.20  Finally, in 
discussing the purpose of the SEC, its former chairman, Arthur Levitt, 
had this to say: “Investor protection is our legal mandate.  Investor 
protection is our moral responsibility.  Investor protection is my top 
personal priority.”21 
To provide this protection, the regulations require that public 
companies produce reams of disclosure.22  Regulators often act as if it 
is axiomatic that transparency benefits investors,23 but scholars have 
 
19 William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 
YALE L.J. 171, 173 (1933). 
20 See In the Matter of the Application of Howard Brett Berger, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-58950, 2008 WL 4899010, at *4 (SEC Admin. Proceeding Nov. 14, 2008). 
21 Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor 
Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading (Feb. 27, 1998) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch202.txt).  Although other goals, 
such as ensuring market transparency or building investor confidence, are often ascribed to 
our securities laws, these can all be seen as different conceptions of investor protection 
rather than as additional objectives.  They are discussed infra in the text accompanying 
notes 41–49.  It is also worth noting that investor protection is not an absolute goal.  Our 
securities laws are designed to protect investors.  But they seek to do so without overly 
burdening the marketplace, compromising investor autonomy, or stymieing widespread 
market participation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006) (requiring the SEC, in its rulemaking, 
to take into account a new rule’s effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation); 
LOSS ET AL., supra note 1. 
22 See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417–18 (2003).  The 
disclosure template is buttressed by anti-fraud rules.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006). 
23 The assumption likely stands on Louis Brandeis’s famous aphorism: “Sunlight is said 
to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND 
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 89 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., Bedford Books of St. Martin’s 
Press 1995 (1914)).  The phrase has been a staple of SEC rhetoric.  See, e.g., Christopher 
Cox, Chairman, SEC, Opening Statement–Open Meeting on the Use of Technology to 
Improve Financial Reporting (May 14, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov 
/news/speech/2008/spch051408cc.htm); Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the 
12th XBRL International Conference (Nov. 7, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch110705cc.htm); Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman, 
SEC, This Year’s Proxy Season:  Sunlight Shines on Auditor Independence and Executive 
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long struggled to provide a satisfying intellectual foundation for this 
intuitive notion.  The populist way to fill this gap is to assert that 
disclosure contributes to informed investor decision making.  You can 
find a version of this story on the SEC’s Web site, where it is 
explained that disclosure “provides a common pool of knowledge for 
all investors to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or 
hold a particular security.”24  According to this theory, disclosure 
protects investors by giving them the tools to look out for themselves. 
Some criticize the very foundation of this theory, arguing that 
mandated disclosures do nothing to improve the informational 
landscape.  According to this critique, issuers are adequately 
incentivized to provide information to the investing public.  If they 
fail to provide information, they will fail to have investors.  
Essentially, the argument is that natural competition for investor 
dollars renders securities regulation irrelevant.25 
This free market critique held much sway in the 1970s and still 
claims adherents.26  It is unpersuasive, however, because it runs 
counter to powerful theoretical arguments and empirical evidence.  As 
I and others have argued elsewhere, companies have ample incentive 
to hide, mischaracterize, and massage information.27  Moreover, 
studies predating the adoption of the mandated disclosure regime 
showed the widespread failure of firms to report basic financial 
information;28 later studies of firms that were exempt from the SEC’s 
disclosure requirements produced similar results.29  Thus, it seems 
quite reasonable to maintain that mandating disclosures and punishing 
those who fail to comply holds promise for improving the quality of 
information available. 
 
Compensation (June 25, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech 
/spch502.htm). 
24 SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, May 3, 2010, http://www.sec.gov/about 
/whatwedo.shtml. 
25 Scholarship in this vein is discussed in LOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at 282–87. 
26 Roberta Romano, for instance, has argued along these lines.  See Roberta Romano, 
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 
passim (1998). 
27 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at 287–89; John C. Coffee Jr., Market Failure and the 
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723–33 (1984); 
Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 521, 538–42 (2009). 
28 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at 288–305. 
29 See id. at 305–11. 
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Additional information, however, is not enough to protect 
investors.  We must have some theory about what happens to this 
information after it is disseminated.  The claim on the SEC’s Web 
site, referenced above, is that investors are reading the disclosures and 
using them to make investing decisions.30  But this is unconvincing.  
In fact, Professor Langevoort has gone so far as to characterize this 
notion as a “myth-story” in which “few have deep faith.”31  The 
reason for doubt is that hardly any individual investors have the time, 
desire, or skill to wade through a company’s prospectus or related 
documents.  Indeed, it strains credulity to believe that individual 
investors are taking into consideration multiple regulatory filings that 
can stretch for hundreds of pages and are littered with financial and 
legal jargon in order to decide how to allocate their investments.  Put 
more technically, individuals are boundedly rational.  Because they 
have limited resources with which to process information, they 
“satisfice”; that is, they cut short their analyses and render decisions 
based on limited, rather than exhaustive, investigation.32 
Even if ordinary investors are not paying attention, however, the 
disclosure regime may still provide them with protection, albeit 
indirectly.  This theory of investor protection, which I have referred to 
as the law-and-economics account, keys in on the role played by 
sophisticated traders.  According to this notion, not only do these 
investors have the capability to understand even complex disclosures, 
they also have a strong incentive to pay attention to them.  If they are 
the first to uncover and trade based upon some valuable, yet so far 
overlooked, piece of information, they can earn substantial profits.33 
Proponents of this theory argue that this self-interested behavior 
benefits ordinary investors.  According to EMH, as sophisticated 
investors trade based on their thorough analyses, market prices 
quickly adjust and come to reflect the information in SEC disclosures, 
as well as whatever other information is publicly available.34  
Because of these market dynamics, the stock prices that ordinary 
 
30 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
31 Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 173 (2002). 
32 See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. 
ECON. REV. 493, 502–03 (1979). 
33 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 18–19 (1991). 
34 See id., at 18–19, 297; LOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at 265 n.11; Paredes, supra note 22, 
at 453. 
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investors see are accurate—not in some absolute metaphysical sense, 
but they are accurate at least in that they represent society’s best guess 
based on available information, a subset of which comes from 
regulatory filings.35  This theory of market pricing forms the basis of 
a revised theory of investor protection.  According to this new theory, 
it is these accurate stock prices that protect investors, and disclosures 
are justified because—as a result of the actions of sophisticated 
investors—they are part of what make stock prices accurate.36 
This more nuanced notion of investor protection has supplanted the 
naïve idea that SEC-mandated disclosure directly impacts investor 
decision making.  It is widely claimed that investors are protected by 
the integrity of stock market prices,37 the SEC relies on market 
efficiency and the actions of sophisticated traders in much of its 
rulemaking,38 would-be reformers search for ways to tweak the 
regulatory structure in order to render the market more efficient and 
stock prices more accurate,39 and even commentators who note 
 
35 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 33; LOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at 265 
n.11; Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 394, 417–18 (2004); Paredes, supra note 22, at 453.  The logic behind 
EMH is explored infra Part II.B.1.a. 
36 See sources cited supra note 35. 
37 See sources cited supra note 35; see also Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, 
Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 
OKLA. L. REV. 291, 296 (1994) (describing the SEC’s embrace of this viewpoint); 
Langevoort, supra note 31, at 136 (describing legal academics’ embrace); Troy A. 
Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:  The SEC’S Regulatory Philosophy, 
Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1001 (2006) (arguing that “the reasonable 
expectations investors have that they can rely on securities prices as approximating 
fundamental value is a cornerstone of securities market integrity”). 
38 Much of the dense information the SEC requires can not be reasonably understood to 
be targeting ordinary investors.  In the 1969 Wheat Report, the SEC acknowledged as 
much.  As the report explains, 
the detailed financial information required by the schedules to the Form 10-K 
report could be intended only for the skillful analyst.  Indeed, it was recognized 
from the beginning that a fully effective disclosure policy would require the 
reporting of complicated business facts that would have little meaning for the 
average investor.  Such disclosures reach average investors through a process of 
filtration in which intermediaries (brokers, bankers, investment advisers, 
publishers of investment advisory literature, and occasionally lawyers) play a 
vital role. 
SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLICIES UNDER THE ’33 AND ’34 ACTS (The Wheat Report) 52 (1969).  Moreover, EMH 
has underpinned important regulatory efforts.  See LOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at 274 n.41. 
39 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 738 (2003); 
Paredes, supra note 22, at 484. 
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problems with the theory still accept it as the best premise on which 
to base regulatory analysis.40 
That we have settled on and continue to build on this justification 
for securities regulation is not surprising, for the remaining modern 
rationales are either incomplete or more positive in nature than 
normative.  One partial rationale for disclosure is that it encourages 
good corporate conduct.41  The theory being that the shame of having 
to disclose certain activities may lead companies to avoid them.42  
This can help justify certain disclosures, like the details of CEO 
compensation,43 but it only goes so far.  The bulk of the information 
that regulations require be disclosed relates to corporate business and 
finances—information more closely connected to valuing companies 
than influencing behavior.44 
Others have argued that, contrary to the account of market behavior 
that I presented above, the stock market is merely informationally 
efficient rather than fundamentally efficient (meaning that it 
incorporates information rapidly but not necessarily accurately).45  
Though this depiction may be easier to defend as an empirical matter, 
it leaves no role for disclosure and, therefore, fails as a theory of 
investor protection.  Why bother adding to the informational content 
of the market if there is no expectation that the additional information 
will induce greater accuracy?46 
We could then turn to softer justifications, which also have little to 
do with investor protection.  For instance, we can argue for disclosure 
based on deontological grounds.  Perhaps there is something 
intrinsically good about transparency.  Or perhaps the rules are really 
a reflection of social mores.  Along these lines, Professor Langevoort 
contends that the motivation for disclosures has become increasingly 
“disconnected from shareholder or investor welfare per se, and 
instead relates to the desire to impose norms that we associate with 
 
40 See, e.g., James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 
75-Year-Old SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 953–54 (2009); Paredes, supra note 22, at 484. 
41 See Paredes, supra note 22, at 463–65. 
42 See id. at 463. 
43 This requirement is found in Item 402 of Regulation S-K.  17 C.F.R. § 229.402 
(2006). 
44 See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2006) (specifying many of the disclosures to be 
included in corporate filings). 
45 See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 140 n.18. 
46 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory 
Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1013–15 (1991). 
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public governmental responsibility—accountability, transparency, 
openness and deliberation—on nongovernmental institutions that 
have comparable power and impact on society.”47  Similarly, 
Professor (now SEC Commissioner) Paredes has argued that 
disclosure may serve an expressive function, setting a moral tone for 
business dealings.48 
Finally, it could be argued that transparency contributes to investor 
confidence, and without that, the market could evaporate.49  This 
rationale fails to explain, however, why investor confidence, without 
an underlying reason for that confidence, actually serves investors—
let alone protects them.  In fact, none of these alternatives offer any 
substantive account of how disclosure protects investors.  This lack of 
satisfying alternatives may explain the resilience of share-price 
accuracy as a theory of investor protection, despite the substantial 
shortcomings that I describe in the sections that follow. 
B.  The Potential Importance of Accurate Stock Prices 
The law-and-economics account hinges on the intuitive notion that 
accurate share prices protect investors.  But intuition can lead us 
astray and is, therefore, an insufficient basis for a theory of 
regulation.50  Instead, the benefits of share-price accuracy should be 
grounded in some broader theory of social ethics.  It turns out, 
however, that fleshing out our intuition about share-price accuracy in 
a more rigorous way is surprisingly difficult. 
Perhaps the intuition is grounded in utilitarianism.  From this 
perspective, we care about maximizing aggregate social utility.51  
Pursuant to this goal, we would seek to protect individuals from 
making bad decisions.  If people purchase the wrong thing or pay the 
wrong price, it undermines their own utility;52 it could also derail 
market competition, which has further deleterious effects on societal 
 
47 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the 
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1066 (2009). 
48 See Paredes, supra note 22, at 466. 
49 See id. at 469. 
50 See John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in 
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 40 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) 
(discussing how intuition is influenced by personal biases). 
51 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 969 n.8 (2001); Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction, in UTILITARIANISM 
AND BEYOND, supra note 50, at 1, 3–4. 
52 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 51, at 1330–34. 
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well-being.53  If consumers make poor choices, good companies may 
be driven out of business, bad ones may profit, and, should this 
happen, society as a whole would be worse off.54  Accurate stock 
prices, therefore, would make sense from a utilitarian perspective if 
they improve investor decision making or, in law-and-economics 
parlance, lead to a more efficient allocation of resources.55 
The contributions that accurate share prices make to this endeavor, 
however, are attenuated at best.  One problem is that, once we move 
from the traditional conception of disclosure as targeting ordinary 
investors to a focus on accurate prices, we give up on the idea of 
helping investors choose the product that best fits their needs.  A 
purchasing decision can be broken down into two components: buyers 
decide whether an asset is right for them and whether its price is a fair 
one.  In investing, this often means selecting the stock or the asset 
class that is both correctly priced and offers the preferred risk profile.  
If investors were actually reading disclosures, then the regulations 
would be contributing to both aspects of the investment decision; 
mandated disclosures would assist investors both in choosing 
appropriate investments and in assessing whether the market price for 
those investments is reasonable. 
Now let us assume that individual investors are not reading the 
disclosures; in this case, their only protection is that they are paying a 
fair price.  Price, however, is only one aspect of an informed decision.  
Under this conception of investor protection, while consumers are 
shielded from overpaying, they are not shielded from buying the 
wrong thing.  Even if stock prices are accurate, investors could still 
make inappropriate stock selections and poor decisions as to asset 
class—mistakes that can be quite costly.56  Therefore, by giving up on 
the notion of broad investor engagement with disclosures, we are 
ignoring an important aspect of utility-maximizing decision making. 
But at least investors would be able to rest assured that prices are 
accurate.  In this context, however, the importance of correct pricing 
 
53 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 passim (1970). 
54 See id. 
55 “A market will be allocatively efficient if it is producing the right goods for the right 
people at the right price.”  GLOBAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (Sunhil 
Chaudary ed.) 4–5 (2009). 
56 See Henry T. C. Hu, The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and 
the Public Corporation Model, 60 BUS. LAW. 1303, 1317–19 (2005) (discussing the 
importance of asset class in determining investor returns). 
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is dubious.  People seek to maximize the utility of their purchases.57  
In a normal market, whether the price is fair is an important 
criterion.58  Not so in investing.  Investors only care about whether 
their stocks go up in value, not whether the prices at which they 
bought or sold were accurate.59 
The impact of accurate share prices is similarly muted when looked 
at from a broader societal perspective.  Normally, inaccurate prices 
stifle innovation and progress because the best companies are not 
being rewarded.  Incorrect pricing could lead to adverse selection and 
even cause the market itself to collapse.60  A similar dynamic is 
possible in the stock market.  Money that companies raise through 
equity issuances is put toward their businesses.  When a particular 
company’s stock price is too high, it means that society is over-
allocating resources to that company’s business.  By the same token, 
when a company’s stock price is too low, there is an under-allocation.  
In both cases, capital is not flowing to its most efficient use.  
Therefore, the market for goods and services, and societal utility in 
general, is degraded.61 
But it is easy to overstate this concern.  Equity makes up a small 
portion of a corporation’s capital structure.  Rather than rely on 
equity, corporations largely finance their endeavors through debt or 
internally generated funds.62  Therefore, even if the market allocates 
capital inefficiently, the impact is rather muted.  Moreover, issuers 
only receive stock market dollars from initial or subsequent public 
offerings.  These transactions, however, make up only a small portion 
of market activity.  The vast majority of stock trades are between 
investors, not between issuers and investors.63  Because the issuer is 
 
57 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 632–33 
(1979). 
58 See id. 
59 See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of 
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 700 (1988). 
60 See Akerlof, supra note 53, at 490. 
61 See John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1307, 1316–17 (1981); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of 
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1010 (1992). 
62 See Stout, supra note 59, at 645–47; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Who Needs the Stock 
Market?  Part I: The Empirical Evidence passim (Oct. 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292403 (presenting an 
empirical study showing the minimal importance of the stock market to corporate finance). 
63 See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN 
SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 137–39 (1979); Stout, supra note 59, at 643–44. 
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not involved, even if these daily trades are made at inaccurate prices, 
there would be no adverse impact on allocative efficiency.64 
Moreover, from a societal perspective, we should not care that 
buyers and sellers may receive too much or too little for their shares 
in any particular transaction.  These trades are just transfers of wealth 
between parties.  Stock trading is zero-sum.65  If one stockholder 
overpays, another underpays, so it washes out.  In the aggregate, 
arbitrarily high or low stock prices should impact all shareholders 
equally, and the accuracy of prices should therefore have no net effect 
on societal wealth. 
Given these concerns, it is worth considering whether it is fairness 
rather than utilitarian goals that are served by accurate share prices.  If 
a stock’s price incorporates all available information, then the most 
sophisticated investor and the least trade on fair terms.  By placing 
everyone on a level playing field, accurate share prices would protect 
individuals from being taken advantage of.66  While this is true, the 
stock market would also be fair, even if prices are irrational, so long 
as the irrationality cannot be exploited.67  To see this, consider a 
sophisticated trader who, after conducting extensive research, 
concludes that a stock is priced too high.  As long as the stock could 
go higher or lower the next day, this additional knowledge does not 
matter.  Despite superior knowledge, the sophisticate is on the same 
level as the average trader.  If stock prices are unpredictable, then 
they are fair, even if they are not necessarily correct. 
Thus, neither utilitarian nor fairness grounds offer compelling 
support for the notion that accurate share prices provide meaningful 
protection.  This lack of an intellectual core not only threatens to 
delegitimize share-price accuracy as a regulatory theory, but it also 
calls into question the legitimacy of securities regulation itself.  When 
the leading theory of investor protection is unsatisfying, we have 
reached an intellectual cul-de-sac. 
 
64 See KRIPKE, supra note 63; Stout, supra note 59.  It could be argued that the trading 
price between shareholders is important in that it impacts the original issue market.  This is 
likely true, at least for seasoned issuers, but given the limited relevance of the stock market 
to allocative efficiency, it is a thin reed on which to justify share-price accuracy as a 
mechanism of investor protection.  See Stout, supra note 59, at 651–56. 
65 KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 108; Coffee, supra note 27, at 733–34; Stout, supra note 
59, at 644 & n.173. 
66 See Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due 
Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1011 (1984). 
67 See Coffee, supra note 27, at 734. 
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II 
ADOPTING AN INTEGRATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
We can move forward in our understanding of securities regulation 
if we view it as part of a societal risk-management structure.  The 
remainder of this piece is devoted to fleshing out this idea and its 
implications.  In this Part, I first provide support for the notion that 
protecting investors from risk is a worthwhile goal for society; then, I 
describe the institutional structure that currently protects individuals 
from market risk.  My description ties together areas that are usually 
seen as only tangentially related: regulation of the stock market and 
regulation of the institutional framework in which it is embedded.  
When looking at regulation of the market itself, I focus on whether 
we can appropriately characterize the contribution that securities 
regulation makes to risk management by simply recasting the current 
law-and-economics narrative in such terms or whether we should 
abandon it.  When analyzing market-related institutions, my focus is 
on accurately capturing the extent to which the institutional structure 
surrounding the stock market protects investors from the risk that 
securities regulation leaves behind. 
A.  Theoretical Underpinnings 
The idea that society should help individuals manage risk is central 
to both a Rawlsian perspective on justice and John Harsanyi’s 
utilitarian framework.  Rawls’s work is in the social contractarian 
tradition, built largely on the thinking of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, 
and Kant.68  Rawls sought to improve upon the state of nature in 
which the social contract was traditionally conceived by replacing it 
with the “original position.”69  Rawls posits that from this state, 
individuals are properly oriented to set up a fair and just system of 
laws and social institutions.70 
In the original position, individuals conceptualize a just society 
from behind a “veil of ignorance.”71  This is a position of uncertainty 
where these individuals do not know whether those whom they 
represent in drafting the social contract will be among the least 
 
68 See Samuel Freeman, Introduction: John Rawls––An Overview, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO RAWLS 1, 10 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). 
69 See id. at 10–11. 
70 See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 14–15 (Erin Kelly ed. 
2001). 
71 Id. at 15. 
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privileged in society or the most privileged.72  When negotiating 
behind this veil, Rawls posits that these individuals would reason 
according to notions of reciprocity and equality.73  This thinking 
would lead them to “regard the distribution of native endowments as a 
common asset” and to agree “to share in the benefits of this 
distribution whatever it turns out to be.”74  In other words, they would 
design society so that those who benefit from morally arbitrary good 
fortune (the so-called “native endowments”), such as being born with 
high intelligence or to a wealthy family, share with those who are less 
lucky.75 
This logic underpins Rawls’s famous “difference principle,” a 
notion of social and economic egalitarianism that is frequently viewed 
as providing a moral justification for a societal commitment to help 
the poor.76  More broadly, however, Rawls’s reasoning presents a 
moral justification for societal risk management.  According to his 
theory, when individuals are ignorant of the role that chance will play, 
they recognize that it is in everyone’s best interest to set up a society 
where the gains and losses it bestows are shared.  The notion that the 
risk of morally arbitrary good or bad fortune should be shared bears 
on a range of social policy questions, and, in particular, it suggests a 
role for government in helping investors manage the risk posed by the 
stock market—its volatility. 
Stock prices vary from hour to hour, day to day, and year to year.  
Such volatility causes a morally arbitrary dispersion in returns among 
investors.  Though this is true for everyone, the phenomenon is 
easiest to see when we consider passive investors, those who simply 
place their money in the market each month and hope for the best 
when they retire.  Although many investors follow this ritual, no two 
take part in it at the same time.  Investors are of different generations, 
and even investors in the same generation may have funds available 
to invest at different points in their lives.  These timing differences 
can have a dramatic impact on returns.  Timing will dictate each 
investor’s exposure to market swings, which means that, despite equal 
 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 76–77, 122–23. 
74 Id. at 75. 
75 See id. at 74–75. 
76 See SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM, MODERN THEORIES OF JUSTICE 169 (1996). 
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contributions, investors who transact at different times may take out 
of the market vastly different sums.77 
The apportionment of stock market riches among these investors, 
therefore, looks like a chance occurrence that is strikingly similar to 
the apportionment of native endowments.  Just like native 
endowments, market returns are assigned randomly among them.  
Rather than being assigned by a birth lottery as Rawls envisions, they 
are assigned by market fluctuations that similarly lie beyond their 
control.  Because these fluctuations are a matter of chance, just as 
with native endowments, none of these individuals has a moral claim 
to the returns they afford.  The distribution of market returns across 
these investors, therefore, can be viewed as a common asset that 
should be shared by all of them.  Government intervention that allows 
investors to manage and share the risk of both good and ill fortune 
and that seeks to quell volatility—the source of disparate market 
returns—is therefore justified in that such measures would effectuate 
a more equitable distribution of chance returns. 
The Rawlsian analysis is even more compelling when we focus on 
the fact that, despite the glamorous role it plays in the public 
imagination, the stock market is largely a retirement vehicle.78  The 
market houses trillions of dollars belonging to U.S. households 
hoping for long-term stock returns to fund retirement.79  Rawls’s view 
that we should constrain the disparities in life that arise from luck is 
particularly appealing here: an intuitive conception of what is just 
tells us that the amount of one’s contributions rather than arbitrary 
market swings should determine the balance of one’s retirement 
account.  The potential for some people to have much more robust 
savings based on chance alone, rather than based on what they 
contribute over time, seems to contravene basic notions of fairness. 
Looking at stock market returns as akin to native endowments, 
therefore, seems to both fit with Rawls’s theory and comport with 
intuition about what is equitable.  Nevertheless, several potential 
challenges to applying Rawlsian analysis to the stock market come to 
mind.  The first is that the native endowments Rawls considers are 
assigned at birth; they are not chance outcomes, like stock market 
returns, that arise in the course of one’s life.  This strikes me as a 
distinction without a difference, however.  The risk-sharing principle 
 
77 See infra notes 287–89 and accompanying text. 
78 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
79 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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seemingly should apply no matter when the risk arises.  This position 
is consistent with the political philosophy literature, which has 
applied the difference principle to risks other than the assignment of 
native endowments,80 and was anticipated by Rawls himself, who 
wrote that the “deeper idea of reciprocity implicit” in the difference 
principle applies not only to native endowments but to “good or bad 
luck over the course of life . . . .”81 
Another potential challenge to the application of Rawls’s ideas in 
this context revolves around voluntariness.  People choose to 
participate in the stock market and, thus, control whether they are 
exposed to the chance that comes with it.  Whether individuals are 
born with native endowments, on the other hand, is completely 
outside individual choice.  Again, however, this distinction does not 
appear to weaken the application of Rawls’s logic in this context.  
Participation in the stock market, while technically voluntary, is 
extraordinarily widespread.82  Moreover, because the stock market is 
the mechanism through which individuals are expected to save for 
retirement, they are herded in that direction through social forces and 
government nudges.83  Because the stock market is currently a central 
part of retirement savings, participation is voluntary only in a weak 
sense of the word.  Aside from this, whether a chance is undertaken 
voluntarily does not change the analysis.  Consider airplane safety.  
Whether someone chooses to fly is voluntary.  Whether they are in a 
plane that crashes is a matter of chance.  If individuals were to 
consider airplane safety in the original position, they would not know 
whether those whom they represent would choose to fly.  Nor would 
they know whether they represent the flyers who would arrive safely 
or those who would be less fortunate.  In this situation, concern for 
potentially unlucky victims would compel them to design airplanes, 
or airplane regulations, that would make air travel safer, even if doing 
so means that planes would be slower or use more fuel.  This is 
analogous to sharing the benefits that stem from native endowments.  
 
80 See, e.g., Serge-Christophe Kolm, Chance and Justice: Social Policies and the 
Harsanyi-Vickrey-Rawls Problem, 42 EURO. ECON. REV. 1393, 1393–94 (1998). 
81 RAWLS, supra note 70, at 124. 
82 See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also INV. CO. INST., 2009 
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 72, 73 fig.6.2 (49th ed. 2009) [hereinafter ICI FACT 
BOOK] (estimating that ninety-two million individuals own mutual funds and that of this 
group eighty percent own equity funds), available at http://www.icifactbook.org 
/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf. 
83 See infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
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In each circumstance, individuals give up the opportunity for the best 
possible state of affairs (in this case, arriving quickly in a fuel-
efficient plane) in exchange for protection from the worst outcomes 
(in this case, involvement in a plane crash).  The fact that people do 
not have to travel on airplanes is largely irrelevant to the analysis. 
Finally, let me address the role of active investing and, in doing so, 
clarify what portion of investor returns I see fit for Rawlsian analysis.  
In my example above, I posited passive investors, who bore no 
responsibility for whether their portfolios surged or plummeted.  But 
not all investors behave this way.  Many actively invest by choosing 
stocks they deem particularly worthy or by handing their money over 
to actively managed mutual funds, where professional money 
managers attempt to pick the good stocks on their behalf.  Intuitively, 
it seems that, to the extent these investors earn their returns as a result 
of time-consuming investment analysis (or by paying others to engage 
in this pursuit) rather than by chance, they should be able to keep 
them. 
While this may be a valid point that finds grounding in desert-
based principles of distributive justice,84 it is not a concern that is 
implicated by the analysis I have in mind.  I am arguing only that the 
market return, often referred to in finance parlance as “beta,” rather 
than the return from legitimately skillful investing, referred to as 
“alpha,” is appropriate for Rawlsian analysis.  Thus, I would view 
gains from the market’s daily fluctuations—those that we see reported 
on the news each evening—as a common asset to be shared.  But I 
would leave any particular investor’s hard-earned market-beating 
returns alone. 
This limitation, however, is not significant.  Much of anyone’s 
return, even those who actively invest, is determined by the market’s 
chance movements.  For example, an actively managed equity fund 
will do well when the market is on an upswing, irrespective of the 
talent of the fund’s manager.  Moreover, even those managers who 
earn market-beating returns in any particular year in all likelihood 
owe their excess returns to chance.85  It is probably not the case that 
the stocks they chose were particularly stellar.  More likely, their 
selections just happened to go up in value as part of the market’s 
 
84 See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE 135 (1985). 
85 See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross Section of 
Mutual Fund Returns, 65 J. FIN. (forthcoming Oct. 2010) (manuscript at passim), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356021. 
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unpredictable daily vituperations.  Financial economists are divided 
on many things, but just about all agree that market volatility 
approximates a random and, therefore, highly unpredictable walk.86  
Perhaps Warren Buffett and a few others can thank skill and hard 
work for a portion of their investing returns, but they are the rare 
exception.87 
Seeking to precisely untangle alpha from beta in any particular 
individual’s portfolio, while theoretically alluring, is quite difficult in 
practice.88  But this is largely an academic concern.  Our current risk-
management scheme comes from the opposite direction.  It helps 
investors contain the market’s overall volatility—and this would also 
be the case if the structure were altered by any of my 
recommendations.  Approaching the issue from this angle allows us to 
narrow the dispersion of returns produced by the market’s swings 
without preventing skilled individuals from profiting from their 
ability to time them. 
Rawls’s conception of political philosophy was conceived as an 
alternative to utilitarianism, which he found morally wanting.89  It is 
somewhat ironic, therefore, that his notion of societal risk sharing is, 
at a broad level, similar to the utilitarian philosophy developed by 
John Harsanyi.  Professor Harsanyi made major contributions to the 
study of game theory, for which he won a Nobel Prize in economics.  
Additionally, and more importantly for our purposes, he staked out a 
novel and influential position in the field of utilitarian ethics.90 
Harsanyi begins his argument by asking us to picture individuals 
setting up societal institutions from a standpoint akin to the original 
position.91  These individuals are tasked with designing a structure for 
 
86 Both behavioral-finance theorists, like Robert Shiller and Adrei Shleifer, and 
efficient-markets theorists, like Eugene Fama, agree on this phenomenon.  See ANDREI 
SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 7, 13 
(2000); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 passim 
(1965); Robert J. Shiller, Stock Price and Social Dynamics, 1984 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECON. ACTIVITY 457, 458–59, 497–98 (1984). 
87 See Fama & French, supra note 85. 
88 See, e.g., id. 
89 See KOLM, supra note 76. 
90 Many of John Harsanyi’s most prominent works are collected in JOHN C. HARSANYI, 
ESSAYS ON ETHICS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1976). 
91 See John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A 
Critique of John Rawls’s Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594, 598 (1975).  Harsanyi 
actually presented his notion of the original position before Rawls, though he did not use 
this phrase, nor did he flesh out the idea to the same extent.  See id. at 595 & n.5. 
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society, but they do not know whether they will be the beneficiaries 
of chance or the victims of it.92  So far, the reasoning is similar to that 
of Rawls.  Where the two part ways, however, is that Harsanyi argues 
that participants in this situation of uncertainty would seek to create a 
society that maximizes expected utility.93  Gone are the notions of 
reciprocity and equality that are central to Rawls’s thought 
experiment.94 
Despite Harsanyi’s utilitarian stance, however, the implications of 
his analysis do not deviate significantly from Rawls’s own 
conclusions.  This is because, in calculating utility without knowledge 
of the future, the individuals in Harsanyi’s thought experiment must 
take into account the risk that they could land anywhere in the social 
strata.95  Risk aversion, therefore, would compel them to set up 
societal institutions that protect them from the risk that they will be 
the unfortunate ones.96  Interestingly, despite a long-running 
academic debate between them, both Rawls and Harsanyi have 
acknowledged how close their positions are.  According to Harsanyi, 
“in practice in most cases my own [utilitarian analysis] will lead to 
similar policy decisions as Rawls’s,”97 while according to Rawls, “the 
utilitarian weighting may be, for practical purposes, so close to the 
difference principle as to make the simplicity of the latter decisive in 
its favor.”98 
Putting Rawls’s jab to one side, it is important to note that, even 
under a utilitarian framework, society has a role in setting up 
institutions that narrow the dispersion of chance rewards.  Like 
Rawls’s fairness analysis, Harsanyi’s utilitarian analysis can be 
applied to stock market risk.  Utility-maximizing investors, the vast 
majority of whom are using the market as a retirement vehicle, may 
very well prefer some insulation from arbitrary, wealth-destroying 
swings. 
 
92 See id. at 598. 
93 See id. 
94 See RAWLS, supra note 70, at 76–77, 122–23. 
95 See Harsanyi, supra note 91, at 598, 600. 
96 This follows from Harsanyi’s acceptance of a concave individual utility function.  See 
John C. Harsanyi, Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a 
Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality, 6 THEORY & DECISION 311, 318–24 
(1975); see also Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: 
Economics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 671, 710 
(1993). 
97 Harsanyi, supra note 96, at 319. 
98 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 144 (revised ed. 1999). 
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These two theories provide support for the notion that society has a 
role in shielding investors from market risk.  Doing so has the 
potential to maximize utility and make saving more fair.  The 
government can provide this protection in essentially two ways: it can 
endeavor to make the stock market itself less volatile, which would 
directly narrow the arbitrary dispersion in investor returns, and it can 
design or support institutions that help investors manage the risk 
stemming from the volatility that remains.  The following sections 
trace the way in which our current institutional framework already 
reflects these two approaches to societal risk management. 
B.  Managing Market Volatility from Within 
Securities regulation can be seen as part of a broader societal risk-
management framework because it dampens the volatility of the 
market itself.  Volatility is inversely correlated with accuracy: the 
more accurate a stock’s price, the less volatile, and vice versa.99  
Because, as discussed below, regulation makes stock prices more 
accurate, it also makes them less volatile. 
To see the relationship between accuracy, volatility, and regulation, 
let us first look at what would happen if stocks were priced correctly.  
Volatility in the market stems from two sources—information and 
investor sentiment (that is, market decisions unexplainable by 
information and, therefore, attributable to fads, emotions, and the 
like).  These sources of volatility would have a more muted impact on 
accurately priced stocks.  If stocks were correctly priced, then 
investor sentiment would be irrelevant.  Prices would not be too high 
or too low based on irrationally gleeful or dark market projections.  
By definition, such irrationality would have no impact.  Thus, this 
source of volatility would be eliminated. 
Moreover, accurately priced stocks would swing less when 
confronted with new information.  To see this, we need to look first at 
what the price of a share represents.  From a finance perspective, the 
price of a company’s stock is the present value of its future income 
streams.100  Thus, a company’s stock price is really a prediction about 
the future, specifically about that company’s future earnings.  The 
 
99 See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 59 J. POL. ECON. 213, 214 
(1961) (“Price dispersion is a manifestation—and, indeed, it is the measure—of ignorance 
in the market.”). 
100 See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 90–91 
(2005). 
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income streams that materialize will be a function of how future 
events impact this company.  Nobody knows for sure what the future 
holds, but an accurate stock price would represent society’s best 
guess.101  An accurate stock price then, by definition, is a better 
prediction about the future than an inaccurate one.  Because it is a 
better prediction, it would move less when the future reveals itself.  
Thus, while accurate stock prices would not completely insulate 
investors from the volatility associated with new information, they 
would, at least, dampen it. 
Accuracy and volatility are so intertwined because the same things 
that cause inaccuracy also cause volatility: investor sentiment distorts 
prices and causes them to swing, and a lack of prescience about the 
future does the same.  It follows, therefore, that if we reduce the 
impact of investor sentiment and improve our ability to predict future 
earnings, we would render stock prices both more accurate and less 
volatile.  That is the impact that disclosure offers to society. 
As discussed in Part I, mandated disclosures add to the depth and 
lucidity of information in the market.102  For one, this added 
information should lead to better predictions about future events and, 
therefore, future cash flows.103  To illustrate, say that a company is 
enduring increasing financial difficulties that eventually necessitate 
significant corporate downsizing and the abandonment of potentially 
profitable business ventures.  In the interim, if traders do not have an 
inkling of this balance-sheet weakness, then the stock price would 
inaccurately reflect a rosy projection for the future.  As a result, the 
price would swing significantly when the cutbacks finally take place 
and the less ambitious agenda can no longer be hidden.  Now let us 
say that, thanks to mandated disclosures, the market is kept abreast of 
the company’s financial woes.  If this were the case, then the stock 
price would anticipate some type of remedial action.  This more 
informed stock price would be more accurate because it would price 
this future event.  It would also be less volatile because, having 
already taken into account the company’s fragile finances, the stock 
price would move much less when the problem is finally dealt with.  
The logic of this illustration can be extended to all relevant 
 
101 See Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 83, 84–85 (2003). 
102 See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
103 See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice 
is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369–70 (1999). 
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information.  The more relevant information that is available about 
companies, the more accurate and steady their stock prices.104 
Further, better informed markets should be less susceptible to 
investor sentiment.  Rumor, innuendo, and the like should have much 
more trouble gaining a foothold if there is more robust information.  
Thus, stock-price inaccuracy and market swings that result from these 
sentiments should be reduced.  The example above can also be used 
to illustrate this phenomenon.  If traders do not have good information 
about the company’s finances, they are left to rely on gossip.  With 
real information, however, this ersatz information is crowded out. 
The notion that disclosure improves accuracy and reduces volatility 
is not merely theoretical.  Numerous studies have shown that the 
introduction of the disclosure regime reduced volatility105—
oftentimes the finding was that the impact was substantial.106  For 
instance, an early study by George Stigler found that volatility was 
reduced by nearly fifty percent.107  Some commentators, including 
Professor Stigler, have suggested that the reduced volatility came 
from forcing the riskiest firms out of the public market.108  There is 
paltry support for this claim, however.109  The more straightforward 
interpretation, as argued by Professor Loss, Professor Fox, and others, 
is that the reduced volatility was associated with more accurate stock 
 
104 Over time, disclosure smoothes price changes, but does not eliminate them.  In the 
example above, the stock’s price should be the same when the truth is known irrespective 
of whether there had been earlier disclosure.  Without disclosure, however, the price 
would have plummeted rather than gradually declined as the company’s financial 
condition worsened.  By smoothing price changes, disclosure lessens volatility.  This is 
easiest to see if you focus on returns.  The returns volatility per year for a stock that goes 
up two percent per year for five years is zero.  The returns volatility of a stock yielding 
zero percent return for four years, which then jumps ten percent in the final year, is much 
greater. 
105 See Coffee, supra note 27, at 735 (noting that “[e]very scholar who has investigated 
the impact of the federal securities laws . . . appears to agree that price dispersion declined 
after the passage of the Securities Act of 1933”); see also George J. Benston, Required 
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 passim (1973); Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal 
Regulation of the Market for New Securities Issues, 24 J. L. & ECON. 613, 627–50 (1981); 
Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the 
Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 309–10 & tbl.7 (1989); George J. 
Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 122 (1964). 
106 See Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the 
Over-the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 216–17 (2007). 
107 See Fox, supra note 103, at 1370; Stigler, supra note 105, at 121 tbl.1. 
108 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at 320; Jarrell, supra note 105, at 668; Stigler, supra 
note 105. 
109 See Fox, supra note 103, at 1371–72 n.83. 
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prices.110  A recent study of the over-the-counter derivatives market 
supports the latter interpretation.111  The market showed reduced 
volatility after the introduction of disclosure, and there was no 
significant change in the types of firms listing on the exchange.112  
Therefore, though the evidence is not perfect, nor absolutely free from 
controversy, there is fairly compelling empirical support for the 
theoretical case that disclosure leads to stock prices that are more 
accurate and less volatile.113 
Taking note of the relationship between accuracy and volatility 
provides an escape from the dead end we reached earlier.114  
Previously, I argued that we had no good theory of how disclosure 
protects investors.  Now we have two possibilities.  For one, the law-
and-economics theory that shareholders are protected by accurate 
stock prices, and that disclosure contributes to this optimal pricing, 
has been resurrected.  I argued that neither utilitarian nor fairness 
analyses provided a theory for why these accurate prices would 
matter.  But this void has now been filled.  Accurate stock prices 
matter because they are less volatile, and protection from volatility is 
something investors care about.  Thus, we can view accurate stock 
prices as the endogenous protection from market risk that society 
provides. 
Recast in this way, the law-and-economics account becomes a 
statement about how the market and regulatory intervention in the 
form of disclosure combine to provide investors with robust 
protection from volatility.  The claim that investors are protected by 
accurate stock prices implies that they are completely shielded from 
movement associated with investor sentiment and that they have stout 
protection from fluctuations stemming from new events.  This is a 
rather bold assertion about the nature of investor protection.  But it is 
not our only option. 
 
110 LOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at 320; Fox, supra note 103, at 1370–71. 
111 Ferrell, supra note 106, at 214. 
112 See id. at 226–28. 
113 Viewing reduced volatility as a benefit of securities regulation challenges earlier 
empirical work, which had concluded that securities regulation does not benefit investors 
because it fails to improve returns.  See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 105, at 120–21.  Taking 
reduced volatility into account also opens the door to further empirical work, which could 
weigh the direct and indirect costs of regulation against its volatility-reducing benefits. 
114 Professors Stout and Coffee flirt with the notion that volatility is important, but do 
not flesh out the idea.  See Coffee, supra note 27, at 735 n.48; Stout, supra note 59, at 701. 
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The above account sees disclosures feeding into a powerful market 
process that vacuums up information, muffles volatility, and produces 
accurate prices.  If the market does not function as well as 
hypothesized, then we can fall back on a more modest version of how 
market forces and securities regulation come together to provide 
protection from risk.  We can abandon the notion that the market 
perfects share prices and, instead, make the weaker claim that 
disclosures are released into a market that, although imperfect, still 
works well enough to translate improved information into prices that 
are relatively more accurate and less volatile.  The choice between the 
two different characterizations of investor protection hinges on 
whether market forces ensure that share prices are, in fact, accurate—
the subject I turn to next. 
1. Assessing Whether Share Prices Are Accurate 
As discussed previously, the idea that stock prices are correct 
emanates from EMH.115  This elegant finance theory held sway over 
the legal and economics academies for much of the last forty years.116  
Recent work, primarily in the field of behavioral finance, however, 
has called the theory into doubt.  In this section, I first lay out the 
arguments for EMH and then discuss the theoretical and empirical 
problems with the idea.  I also discuss the epistemology of finance 
and the influence of “fat-tail” events, both of which further call into 
question whether we can say that stock prices are truly accurate.  In 
the end, I conclude that behavioral finance and related concerns so 
enfeeble the notion that share prices are correct that we should no 
longer make the claim as part of our theory of securities regulation. 
a.  The Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
EMH is based on the following layered reasoning.  First, let us 
assume that investors are rational.  This means that they have 
unlimited willingness and ability to consider all relevant information 
and choices and have unlimited mental capacity upon which to draw 
in order to weigh their alternatives and reach a decision.117  If 
 
115 See Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 2 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 1, 3 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005); supra notes 4–5 
and notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
116 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 1–2 (describing embrace in economics literature); 
Langevoort, supra note 31, at 136 (describing embrace in legal literature). 
117 See Paredes, supra note 22, at 434. 
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investors are rational, they will value securities at their true or so-
called fundamental value.118  Second, even if not all investors live up 
to this standard, we can assume that any errors made by irrational 
investors are random noise and, therefore, cancel out.119  The result 
would be that securities prices are accurate despite this 
irrationality.120 
Finally, let us assume that investors err in systematic ways.  This 
would cause security prices to begin to deviate from fundamental 
value.  Any deviation, however, would be cleaned up nearly 
instantaneously by rational arbitrageurs, who can make a profit by 
exploiting this irrational divergence from correct pricing.121 
EMH is an interesting theory in the abstract.  It becomes especially 
powerful and controversial when the claim is made that the theory 
applies to the U.S. stock market.  For a while, however, empirical 
research seemed to show that this was indeed the case.  In fact, the 
prominent economist Michael Jensen famously claimed in 1978 that 
“there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid 
empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis.”122 
The empirical support for EMH comes primarily from studies that 
show the rapidity with which stock prices incorporate information and 
the difficulty that market professionals have in beating the stock 
market.  Rapid adjustment to information is shown through so-called 
event studies, which look at news events that should influence stock 
prices, such as an earnings announcement or changes in management, 
and then study their actual impacts.123  For example, one study looked 
at the behavior of the stock price of takeover targets surrounding the 
time when a bid was announced.  The study showed that the stock 
price shot up on the day of the announcement.  After that day, 
however, the stock’s price showed no lingering movements, 
indicating that the information had been immediately incorporated 
into price.124 
 
118 SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 2–3. 
119 Id. at 3. 
120 Id. 
121 See id. at 3–4. 
122 Michael C. Jensen ed., Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. 
FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978). 
123 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 7–8. 
124 See id.; Arthur J. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider 
Trading: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855, 866 (1981). 
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It could be argued that, while these event studies show that stock 
prices react quickly, they do not necessarily demonstrate that prices 
react correctly.  This loophole can be closed, however, by resorting 
back to economic theory.  Theory tells us that the reaction must be 
accurate.  If the price reaction were not, it would create an arbitrage 
opportunity that would be swallowed up by sophisticated traders.  
Their trades, in turn, would bring prices to where they should be.  
According to this logic, because the price jumps and then remains 
stable, it must be correct.125 
Event-study findings are supported by research that shows the 
difficulty investment professionals have in beating the stock 
market.126  Each year billions of dollars are spent on actively 
managed mutual funds.127  These funds search for and seek to exploit 
arbitrage opportunities in an attempt to earn returns for their 
shareholders in excess of the stock market as a whole, or some other 
benchmark index of securities, without incurring excess risk.  By and 
large, however, these funds fail in their pursuit.  According to 
efficiency theorists, this shows that stocks are quickly, if not nearly 
instantaneously, priced correctly.  If professionals cannot take 
advantage of mispricings, it means they must not be there. 
Put all of this together and you have an academic juggernaut: 
elegant theory backed with a mountain of confirming empiricism.  
For a long while, therefore, a faith in share-price accuracy seemed to 
rest on sound footing.  This faith, however, has increasingly been 
shaken in the face of both theoretical and empirical challenges. 
 
125 See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 140 n.18. 
126 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 4; see, e.g., Fama, supra note 86, at 
passim; Burton G. Malkiel, Reflections on the Efficient Market Hypothesis: 30 Years 
Later, 40 FIN. REV. 1 passim (2005). 
127 See Kent Daniel et al., Investor Psychology in Capital Markets: Evidence and Policy 
Implications, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 139, 174 (2002) (estimating ten billion dollars spent 
each year on actively managed mutual funds); Mark Hulbert, Can You Beat the Market?  
It’s a $100 Billion Question, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at BU6; Kenneth R. French, The 
Cost of Active Investing 20–21 (Apr. 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105775 (estimating yearly total costs 
of active investing, including, but not limited to, fees paid to managers of actively 
managed mutual funds, to be approximately 0.67% of the value of U.S. equity); cf. Jeff 
Schwartz, Mutual Fund Conflicts of Interest in the Wake of the Short-Term Trading 
Scandals: Encouraging Structural Change Through Shareholder Choice, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 91, 114–15 (2005) (arguing that mutual fund fees are excessive). 
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b.  The Irrationality of Stock Prices 
As mentioned above, EMH rests on the following syllogism: 
investors are rational and will therefore value securities rationally; 
even if some do not, their errors will cancel out; and finally, even if 
the errors do not cancel out, rational arbitrageurs will step in to 
correct any mispricings.128  In this section, I analyze each of these 
assumptions, with a focus on the last, which is the most sophisticated 
and realistic. 
The first path, in which we assume that investors are rational and 
therefore value securities rationally, is essentially a tautology.129  It 
also has limited practical application.  Though some may still argue 
that individuals are rational,130 there have been numerous studies that 
cast serious doubt on this assumption, and, in the investing context in 
particular, there is reason for pause.  Individuals are notoriously 
unsophisticated about finance and investing.131  On top of that, their 
decision-making processes are far from perfect. 
A complete review of the human biases that are thought to impact 
decision making in the investment context is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but I will describe some of the most notable.132  One robust 
finding is that people do not weigh losses and gains equally.133  More 
specifically, in the words of Adam Smith, “we suffer more . . . when 
we fall from a better to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy when we 
 
128 See Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market 
Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 994–95 (2007); 
supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text. 
129 Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: 
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 857 (1992) (mentioning the 
tautologous nature of EMH); Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and 
Martingales, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1583, 1593, 1613 (1989) (discussing tautologies in the 
mathematical structure of EMH). 
130 Richard Epstein comes close to defending this model of decision making.  See 
Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 803, 810–11, 823–31 (2008) (arguing that what appear to be mistakes of bounded 
rationality are truly instances of strategic behavior). 
131 See OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ASSISTANCE, SEC, THE FACTS ON SAVING AND 
INVESTING 14–19 (1999) [hereinafter FACTS ON SAVING AND INVESTING] (compiling 
research showing the public’s lack of comfort with basic financial concepts and ignorance 
of investing basics). 
132 For a more comprehensive survey, see Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 12–22. 
133 This phenomenon is frequently referred to as loss aversion.  See Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 
Q. J. ECON. 1039, 1054–58 (1991) (reviewing empirical work and its implications). 
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rise from a worse to a better.”134  Building on Smith’s insight, studies 
have shown that people weigh losses about twice as much as gains.135  
Among other things, this disparity is thought to impact investing as 
one psychological force behind the well-documented disposition 
effect—the finding that people tend to hold onto poorly performing 
stocks for too long and sell winners too quickly.  The thinking is that 
investors are anxious to sell winners because they are eager for gains, 
but they hold onto the losers because they do not want to face 
losses.136 
People also evidence traits related to overconfidence.137  They tend 
to overestimate the probability of positive things happening to them 
and underestimate the probability of negative events.138  Moreover, 
when good or bad things do happen, they take credit for the successes 
and blame the failures on bad luck.139  People also assign too much 
precision to their own estimates.  For instance, experiments show that, 
when individuals say they are ninety-eight percent sure in their 
predictions, they are only right fifty to eighty percent of the time.140  
And even though people are often wrong about things, they do not 
like to let go of their beliefs: they tend to search out evidence that 
supports rather than contradicts their thinking, and people have been 
known to interpret evidence contrary to their viewpoint as actually 
supportive.141  This rigidity is buttressed by the so-called hindsight 
bias, which causes events that were unpredictable ex ante to appear 
 
134 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 213 (D. D. Raphael & A. L. 
Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1759). 
135 See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity 
Premium Puzzle, 110 Q. J. ECON. 73, 74 (1995). 
136 Incongruous weighing of gains and losses is an implication of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s prospect theory, which posits that investors have a utility function that is 
concave over gains and convex over losses.  For a discussion of prospect theory and the 
disposition effect, see Stephen P. Ferris et al., Predicting Contemporary Volume with 
Historic Volume at Differential Price Levels: Evidence Supporting the Disposition Effect, 
43 J. FIN. 677, 678–79 (1988); Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition to Sell 
Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777, 778–
79 (1985). 
137 See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 146. 
138 See Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social 
Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193, 196–97 (1988). 
139 This is referred to as the self-attribution bias.  See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 
115, at 12 n.10; Langevoort, supra note 31, at 147. 
140 See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 475 (Daniel Kahneman 
et al. eds., 1982). 
141 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 15. 
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predictable ex post.142  Because of this bias, rather than change their 
behavior or beliefs about what they can predict, people feel confident 
with the status quo.143  What all of this research suggests is that 
people do not approach investing with an open mind and an eagerness 
to learn.  Instead, they come at it with a sclerotic and under-informed 
worldview. 
To make matters worse, people are bad at probabilities.  They draw 
broad conclusions based on small samples (the so-called 
representativeness heuristic);144 their decisions are overly impacted 
by hearing about poignant, though statistically insignificant, 
events;145 and instead of concentrating on aggregate data, they look to 
their own experiences or the experiences of friends and family as a 
guide.146  These traits likely explain why investors pick stocks based 
on recent trends,147 fads,148 gut instincts,149 and tips from friends,150 
rather than on the probabilistic computational form of analysis that 
the rational actor would employ.  In the end, the wide array of 
decision-making flaws that psychologists have documented paints a 
 
142 See Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and 
Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, 
supra note 140, at 335, 341. 
143 See id. at 343; cf. Bruno Biais & Martin Weber, Hindsight Bias, Risk Perception, 
and Investment Performance, 55 MGMT. SCI. 1018 passim (2009) (analyzing the 
detrimental effect the hindsight bias has on investing). 
144 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 13–14; Robert J. Shiller, Bubbles, Human 
Judgment, and Expert Opinion, 58 FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-Jun. 2002, at 18, 19–20. 
145 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, SCIENCE, Sept. 27, 1974, at 1124. 
146 See Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 30 
(1998); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 
241–42 (2008). 
147 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 154–55 (discussing positive feedback investing, the 
phenomenon where traders chase stocks trending higher and sell those trending lower); 
Shiller, supra note 101, at 93. 
148 See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY 49–64 (1989) (discussing the role of 
fads in investing); Michael J. Cooper et al., A Rose.com by Any Other Name, 56 J. FIN. 
2371, 2373 (2001) (finding that adding “dot.com” to a company’s name was associated 
with a substantial increase in share price). 
149 See Shiller, supra note 144, at 20 (arguing that intuitive thinking and overconfidence 
in intuition are behind both market bubbles and collapses). 
150 See Gordon J. Alexander et al., Mutual Fund Shareholders: Characteristics, 
Investor Knowledge, and Sources of Information 9–10 (Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Economics Working Paper No. WP97-13, 1997), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/workpaper/wp97-13.pdf (survey showing that 37.6% of 
mutual fund shareholders relied heavily on family and friends for investing information). 
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picture of the average investor that casts serious doubt on the notion 
that they are valuing stocks perfectly rationally. 
A more nuanced way to reason that stock prices should be accurate 
is to posit that even if certain investors are, in fact, irrational, their 
trades are random and, therefore, cancel out.  Though at first 
compelling, this notion also fails in practice.  One reason the research 
mentioned above is notable is that it suggests that we all suffer from 
the same flaws and are thus likely to err in the same ways.  That being 
the case, we should not expect people’s mistakes to simply cancel out.  
For example, if we know that investors overemphasize recent events, 
then a positive or negative news event could be expected to cause a 
similar overreaction among many investors.  If a particular event 
inspires investors to irrationally buy or sell en masse, there is no 
canceling out. 
More generally, large groups of investors appear to fall prey to fads 
and norms.151  Popular sentiment can build in support of new 
pseudoscientific theories about why certain stocks, certain sectors, or 
the market as a whole make a particularly good (or bad) 
investment.152  Once these stories take hold they can create feedback 
loops that further amplify their effect and lend them an air of truth.153  
Let us say there is a particular stock that is supposedly about to rise in 
value.  If a group of people believes this story and buys the stock, 
they will cause its price to rise regardless of the accuracy of the 
prediction.154  The rising stock price becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  If the story is reported by the national media, the stock 
could potentially soar.  This tendency for herd-like behavior, 
accompanied by feedback loops, further undermines the idea that 
investor irrationality simply cancels out.155 
If we accept that the irrationality of ordinary investors can distort 
stock prices, EMH nevertheless stands as long as we believe that 
rational arbitrageurs (i.e., sophisticated investors) will attack and 
 
151 See SHILLER, supra note 148, at 49–64; Shiller, supra note 86, at 457 (arguing that 
stock-price movements are a social phenomenon). 
152 See Shiller, supra note 144, at 21. 
153 See Shiller, supra note 101, at 91–96. 
154 See Shiller, supra note 144, at 19, 23. 
155 Cf. Andrew Jackson, The Aggregate Behaviour of Individual Investors (July 29, 
2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=536942 (empirical analysis showing strong systematic patterns among 
individual investors). 
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eliminate price discrepancies that arise.156  This assertion is the most 
compelling, and, as a result, it has been the focal point of behavioral 
finance.  These scholars tend to accept the notion that rational 
arbitrageurs exist, but they challenge the idea that they can fix price 
discrepancies.157  In the next section, I will lay out some of the 
compelling arguments that behavioral finance theorists set out as to 
the limits of arbitrage. 
(i)  Limited Arbitrage 
The story of rational arbitrage—that informed investors ferret out 
mispricings and, in doing so, eliminate them—is intuitively 
appealing.  This theory, however, rests on certain tenuous 
assumptions.  For it to work, mispriced securities must create the 
opportunity for sophisticated traders to earn risk-free and cost-free 
profits.158  If mispricings are not quite so easy to exploit, 
sophisticated traders may allow them to fester or even engage in 
transactions that make them worse.  As discussed below, behavioral 
finance scholars have shown that the risks and costs involved with 
arbitrage are substantial in the real world and have modeled the stock-
price distortion this creates. 
First, let us consider the role of risk in arbitrage trading.  
Technically, a pure arbitrage transaction involves no risk.159  An 
example would be to simultaneously sell an asset for a high price, say 
one hundred dollars, and buy an identical one for a low price, say 
eighty dollars.160  That transaction would bring in a risk-free profit of 
twenty dollars.  If such discrepancies appeared in any market, they 
would be gobbled up immediately and disappear. 
EMH contends that this dynamic is what leads to accurate prices in 
the stock market.  From a finance perspective, a stock is the right to 
receive a series of cash flows over time.161  Thus, all stocks are 
comparable according to this metric.  Moreover, in a deep market like 
 
156 See Shiller, supra note 101, at 96. 
157 As Andrei Shleifer put it, “[t]he central argument of behavioral finance states that, in 
contrast to the efficient markets theory, real-world arbitrage is risky and therefore limited.”  
SHLEIFER, supra note 86.  Behavioral finance, however, also carries a broader connotation.  
See id. at 23 (“At the most general level, behavioral finance is the study of human 
fallibility in competitive markets.”). 
158 Id. at 28; Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 3–4. 
159 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
160 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 3–4. 
161 See id. at 2 (discussing valuation of securities based on future cash flows). 
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the New York Stock Exchange, all shares should have counterparts 
with very similar or identical projected future cash flows.162  
According to EMH, because traders can substitute one security for 
another, prices should be kept in tow.  If the price of a stock were to 
rise for no good reason, it would create an arbitrage opportunity, 
which a trader could, and would, exploit by selling the security and 
purchasing one offering analogous cash flows at the correct price.  
The selling activity should realign prices accordingly.163 
Behavioral finance theorists point out that much of the time, 
however, there is no such thing as exact, or even close, substitutes.  
The lack of substitutes imbues stock trading with risk.  Assume a 
sophisticated investor owns AT&T stock and now believes it to be 
overpriced.  That investor can sell AT&T and purchase Verizon 
(which, let us assume, is currently correctly priced).  Though it is 
superficially similar to the ideal arbitrage transaction, this exchange is 
far from risk-free. 
For one, it involves so-called “fundamental risk.”164  This risk 
reflects the reality that AT&T and Verizon, though they are both vast 
telecommunications firms, are simply not identical.  Thus, 
information idiosyncratic to one company or the other could create 
arbitrage losses.  For instance, assume that after the transaction, 
AT&T releases a particularly strong earnings report.  This news may 
cause its stock price to justifiably rise further in value, and the 
arbitrageur will wish never to have made the trade.  Notice that if the 
two shares were truly identical, then new information would not 
impact the two assets differently; the arbitrageur would have avoided 
this risk. 
Such a transaction also involves so-called “noise-trader risk.”165  
This is the risk that the pricing disparity, although fundamentally 
incorrect, will continue or become even more misguided over time as 
a result of the purchasing activities of unsophisticated investors.  In 
the example above, even though the arbitrageur may be correct in 
 
162 This is closely related to the idea of complete markets.  See MELISSA HARDY & 
LAWRENCE HAZELRIGG, PENSION PUZZLES: SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE GREAT DEBATE 
118 (2007) (“To the extent that rational expectations and the efficient-market hypothesis 
are actualized in complete markets, asset prices would always tend toward . . . 
fundamental values . . . and all information relevant to the market would already be 
reflected in prices.”); SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 8–9. 
163 SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 3–4, 8–9, 13–14. 
164 See id. at 14; Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 4–5. 
165 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 14–15; Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 5–6. 
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thinking AT&T is overpriced, the stock could continue to rise thanks 
to some market rumor.  Even the most fundamentally sound bet made 
by sophisticated investors can be frustrated by investor sentiment.  
The presence of both fundamental and noise-trader risk alters the 
incentives of arbitrageurs.  When facing these risks, they may not be 
so quick to assault potential mispricings. 
What is perhaps even more problematic is that these risks are 
amplified when we adopt a broader perspective.  Perhaps the most 
important asset class, the stock market as a whole, has no close 
substitute.  One cannot sell short166 shares in the Wilshire 5000 index, 
for instance, and buy shares in a close substitute.  There is only one 
U.S. stock market.  Look at the risks that this creates.  An investor 
that suspects that the market is overvalued could choose to sell short 
the index or sit the market out by, for example, investing in cash or 
debt instruments. 
There is fundamental risk in both of these approaches, however.  In 
either case, the trader misses out on any good news that may 
subsequently justify the market’s prices.  In fact, for short sellers 
good news is doubly bad in that, not only would they miss out on any 
gains, but they would eventually have to cover their positions, which 
means incurring losses to the extent that the market has risen in value.  
Just as importantly, the arbitrageur would also incur noise-trader risk.  
The market could continue to rise despite its deviation from 
fundamental value.  Alan Greenspan lamented the stock market’s 
irrational exuberance in 1996.167  Even though the bubble eventually 
popped five years later, anyone who sold short based on his correct 
prognostication and had to cover before the overdue collapse would 
have endured severe losses. 
As the example illustrates, it is quite risky to bet against significant 
market moves.  That being the case, many sophisticated investors may 
turn the other cheek, which, in turn, allows the market to further 
inflate.168  Even more troubling, the risks associated with betting 
 
166 In a short sale, an investor borrows a security and sells it on the open market.  It is 
the borrower’s responsibility to then repay the lender the actual security (no matter its 
price) at some future date.  This mechanism allows the short seller to profit from price 
dips.  See DON M. CHANCE & ROBERT BROOKS, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES AND 
RISK MANAGEMENT 6 (8th ed. 2010). 
167 Sharon Reier, 5 Years Later, Greenspan’s ‘Irrational Exuberance’ Alert Rings True, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/01/your-money/01iht-mexub 
_ed3_.html. 
168 Shiller, supra note 101, at 97. 
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against stock market bubbles may lead these investors to the 
conclusion that it is better to ride a bubble than attempt to pop it.  A 
rational strategy may be to attempt to fuel unsophisticated investor 
speculation, participate in the rallying market, and trust your ability to 
jump out before the crash.169  In the end, because sophisticated 
investors are no doubt sensitive to the substantial risks associated with 
contrarian bets, it is too much to assume that they will always, or even 
often, make the trades necessary to quell irrational market behavior.  
Thus, this check on mispricings appears much weaker than EMH 
assumes. 
EMH also assumes away the transaction costs associated with 
arbitrage.  But these may be substantial.170  Most importantly, 
uncovering mispricings takes a great deal of skill and time.171  In 
addition, an arbitrageur needs to have the money to finance 
transactions.  That means they must court and pay returns to investors 
and creditors.172  Moreover, trading stock involves paying brokerage 
commissions and taxes.173  These costs mean that not all mispricings 
are profitable to attack.  Arbitrageurs will focus only on those that 
have high enough expected returns relative to costs.  As a result, 
many mispricings may go unchallenged. 
Related to transaction costs are the limits to arbitrage that are built 
into the market’s structure or that stem from legal or even cultural 
factors.  The best example here relates to short selling.174  Because 
this practice involves the sale of borrowed shares, short sales can 
theoretically place significant downward pressure on inflated prices 
and thereby serve as a check on stock-price bubbles.  But because 
short sales are bets against stock prices, they are often seen as 
unsavory.  Likely in part for this reason, this practice is regulated and 
sometimes even banned, as was the case in the fall of 2008 when the 
 
169 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 154–74 (describing model of rational arbitrage, 
where arbitrageurs destabilize markets rather than correct them); Markus K. Brunnermeier 
& Stefan Nagel, Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble, 59 J. FIN. 2013 passim (2004) 
(empirical study showing hedge funds riding rather than popping the Internet bubble); 
Shiller, supra note 101, at 96–97. 
170 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 6–7 & n.5 (describing implementation 
costs, including “horizon risk”—the risk that a mispricing will take so long to correct that 
returns will have been eaten away by transaction costs). 
171 See id. at 6. 
172 As discussed infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text, sophisticated traders 
traditionally manage other people’s money. 
173 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 6. 
174 See supra note 166. 
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SEC outlawed short sales of certain financial stocks.175  Moreover, 
mutual funds, supposedly a prime institutional check on market 
irrationality, face legal, cultural, and contractual constraints on their 
short selling activities.176 
In addition, practically speaking, shares sometimes are simply 
unavailable to short.  Consider the following classic example.  In 
March 2000, 3Com Corporation conducted an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) for shares in its subsidiary, Palm, Inc.177  During the IPO, the 
price of Palm shares shot up beyond the price of 3Com shares.178  
This reaction, however, was irrational because, as a result of 3Com’s 
continued holdings in Palm, each shareholder of 3Com indirectly 
owned 1.5 shares of Palm.179  Therefore, given that 3Com was at the 
very least a solvent company, each share of 3Com had to be worth at 
least 1.5 times that of Palm.  This investor irrationality should 
represent a perfect arbitrage opportunity.  An arbitrageur could sell 
short Palm and buy 3Com.  More specifically, for every one share of 
3Com bought, a trader could short 1.5 shares of Palm.  This should 
represent risk-free profit.  In buying 3Com, the trader is implicitly 
purchasing shares of Palm at a low price, and, in shorting Palm, the 
trader is simultaneously reselling Palm shares at a high price.  
Sophisticated traders, therefore, should have jumped on the 
opportunity, and the price disparity should have disappeared instantly.  
Despite the purity of the arbitrage opportunity, however, this 
mispricing lasted for weeks.180  In a recent article, the authors blame 
market dynamics associated with short selling.  They argue that there 
were not enough short sellers to meet demand.  This meant that some 
arbitrageurs could not obtain shares to short, and those that could 
were charged exorbitant prices, dampening the appeal of the Palm 
 
175 See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act 
Release No. 58166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42379 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter Emergency Order]. 
176 See Andres Almazan et al., Why Constrain Your Mutual Fund Manager?, 73 J. FIN. 
ECON. 289, 295 (2004) (reporting that as of 2000, 66.1% of mutual fund management 
contracts contained restrictions on short sales); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 39 
(referring to “the lingering taint that makes institutional investors such as mutual funds 
reluctant to pursue short-selling strategies”); Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: 
A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 323, 332 (2007) (discussing legal framework for 
short sales by mutual funds). 
177 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 11; Shiller, supra note 101, at 97–98. 
178 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 11. 
179 See id. 
180 Id. 
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price discrepancy.181  The above is an unusually poignant example of 
how practical limits can allow mispricings to continue even in a 
situation that seems ideally suited for arbitrage. 
In sum, EMH says that the equilibrium price that results from 
market pressures is an accurate one.  Behavioralists posit a pricing 
equilibrium that is more subtle and complex.  They see prices as 
resulting from a market process that involves two groups: irrational 
investors, who execute trades that pull prices away from fundamental 
value, and rational arbitrageurs, who sometimes join the irrational 
investors and sometimes trade against them, depending on the risks 
and costs of the trading strategies available.  In this more intricate 
version of the market, prices can drift far away from their 
fundamental values. 
(ii)  Limits to Arbitrageurs 
As noted above, it is commonplace in behavioral finance 
scholarship to pose a dichotomy between ordinary investors and 
rational arbitrageurs.  Behavioral finance scholars assume that 
sophisticated traders are rational, so they can create models of market 
behavior that diverge from EMH—and that is difficult to do unless 
you hold onto the assumption that at least some actors are rational.182  
This technique has proved quite fruitful as many noted market 
inefficiencies have been explained by modeling market behavior as a 
dynamic between irrational and rational investors.  For example, 
models have been built to explain why shares of closed-end mutual 
funds trade below fair market value (the so-called “closed-end fund 
puzzle”)183 and why shares with fundamentally related future cash 
flows can sometimes trade for values completely at odds with this 
relationship (the so-called “twin-shares puzzle”).184  Behavioral 
theorists also have created models of how bubbles can form.  In these 
models, rational arbitrageurs, when facing constraints on their ability 
to bring prices to fundamental value, find it rational to foment bubbles 
rather than pop them.185 
 
181 See id.; Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, Can the Market Add and Subtract?  
Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-outs, 111 J. POL. ECON. 227 passim (2003) (discussing 
Palm case as well as other similar instances of mispricing); cf. SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 
47 (discussing difficulties with short selling); Shiller, supra note 101, at 97–100 (same). 
182 See SHILLER, supra note 148, at 435; SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 25. 
183 See generally SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 53–88. 
184 See, e.g., id. at 28–52. 
185 See, e.g., id. at 156–74; see Shiller, supra note 101, at 96–97. 
 214 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 175 
Though useful for modeling, the assumption that sophisticated 
traders are rational, utility-maximizing agents hides a great deal of 
nuance.  Relaxing this assumption reveals reasons to doubt stock-
price accuracy that have been less fully developed in the behavioral 
finance literature.  In this section, I note how the institutional 
structure of the typical arbitrageur and the bounded rationality of 
sophisticated traders further constrain the arbitrage process. 
(1)  Institutional Structure 
The typical arbitrageur trades on behalf of others.186  They are 
managers of hedge funds, mutual funds, or institutional accounts.187  
In each case, there is a separation of ownership from control, and this 
interferes with both the ability of the traders to seek out arbitrage 
opportunities and their incentive to find them. 
First, let us look at how the agency relationship hampers the search 
for arbitrage opportunities.  Assume the stock market is rising, but 
certain fund managers correctly believe that the increase in prices 
fails to be justified by fundamentals.  They may be right to sit out this 
bull market, but, if the market’s run continues for too long, their 
investors may have all left for funds with managers who, although 
less prescient, are generating better returns.188  Stories are legion 
about fund managers labeled as dullards and put out of business 
because they pulled out of, or bet against, stock-price bubbles a bit 
too early.189  This threat of investor withdrawals may cause fund 
managers to think twice before taking bold contrarian positions. 
In the hedge fund context, the managers have some protection in 
that they often subject their investors to lock-up periods that last from 
several months to several years.190  But while this may partially 
ameliorate their concerns about investor flight, it is not hedge funds 
who are the primary movers in the stock market.  Hedge funds only 
own 2.2% of U.S. equities, making them a relatively minor player.191  
 
186 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 29. 
187 See id. at 89. 
188 See id. 
189 Cf. RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEAMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE 
FUNDS, AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION 179 (2007) (telling the story of how three famously 
successful investors—Warren Buffett, George Soros, and Julian Robertson—were 
criticized or suffered losses because they were skeptical of Internet stocks before the tech-
bubble collapsed). 
190 See Hedge Funds: All Locked Up, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2007, at 40. 
191 French, supra note 127, at 7. 
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Mutual funds, on the other hand, play an enormous role, owning 
about thirty-two percent of these securities.192 
In contrast to hedge funds, mutual funds need to be extremely 
liquid.  By law, they must honor redemption requests nearly 
immediately.193  Mutual fund managers, therefore, have far less 
leeway than their hedge fund counterparts when it comes to waiting 
for price corrections.  This need to immediately respond to investors 
weakens their ability to serve as a check on stock prices.  It is vastly 
difficult to make bets contrary to prevailing wisdom when, if such 
investments fail to produce payouts immediately, shareholders could 
dart to a competitor. 
This tenuous dynamic also makes it harder for mutual fund 
managers to halt investor panics.  If the stock market is dropping and 
investors want out, they have the right to redeem their mutual fund 
shares.194  If managers face a high volume of redemption requests, 
they must sell the securities in their fund’s portfolio in order to 
generate cash to meet these requests—even if their projections tell 
them to wait it out.195  This forced selling could contribute to a 
feedback loop, in which price declines cause investors to redeem fund 
shares, which causes mutual funds to sell, which leads to further price 
declines and further redemptions.  Because of the institutional 
structure of mutual funds, these sophisticated traders become 
participants in, rather than hedges against, price collapse.  Investors 
liquidated huge sums from mutual funds in the fall of 2008, perhaps 
accelerating the market’s decline.196  But fund managers could do 
nothing to stymie the dash for the exits.  Thus, even though stock 
market investing has to a great extent been delegated to financial 
professionals, particularly mutual funds, the overriding responsibility 
that these professionals owe to their investors curbs their ability to 
invest in ways that fully reflects their financial acumen.197 
 
192 See id. at 2. 
193 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2006) (requiring that mutual fund shares be redeemed 
and paid for by the fund within seven days of an investor’s request). 
194 See id. 
195 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 107. 
196 See Geoffrey Rogow & Kejal Vyas, Redemption Songs: Some Get New Leases on 
Life in Portfolios, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at C5. 
197 Cf. SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 89–107 (modeling how the agency relationship 
inherent in professional money management can undermine effective arbitrage, 
particularly in extreme market conditions). 
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The principal-agent relationship not only handcuffs fund managers 
in their pursuit of arbitrage opportunities.  It also may alter their 
agendas.  Shareholder reliance on imperfect management-oversight 
mechanisms likely explains why we see mutual fund managers follow 
stock-picking strategies that seem aimed at creating a certain 
appearance for their shareholders rather than exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities. 
One common finding is that mutual fund managers tend to herd 
together; that is, they tend to move as a group from one trendy stock 
or segment of the market to another.198  While it is possible that the 
managers are simultaneously discovering the same arbitrage 
opportunities, it seems more likely that something other than 
independent financial analysis is behind this phenomenon.  One 
possibility is that the fund managers are being driven by job security 
concerns.  Because they are compared against their peers, there is 
occupational safety in numbers.  It is much better to be wrong when 
everyone else is wrong, than to be wrong when everyone else is 
right.199  Given how difficult it is to beat the market, and the ease 
with which mutual fund shareholders can switch their allegiance, 
sticking close to others in the field may be a wise path to secure 
employment. 
Along the same lines, mutual fund managers have been known to 
stick close to the benchmarks against which they are measured.200  In 
addition to being assessed against their peers, managers are 
commonly measured against benchmark market indexes like the S&P 
500.201  The theory is that good fund managers should beat their 
index.  Researchers have found, however, that not only do fund 
managers frequently fail to do this, but also that returns tend to hover 
close to the benchmark.202  Again, one plausible explanation for this 
would be that staying close to the index minimizes one’s chances of 
looking bad when it is time to judge results.203 
 
198 See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 149 & n.58. 
199 Or as John Keynes put it: “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to 
fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE 
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 158 (1936). 
200 SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 12–13. 
201 See id. at 12. 
202 See Louis K.C. Chan et al., On Mutual Fund Investment Styles, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1407, 1409–10 (2002). 
203 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 12–13. 
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“Window-dressing,” a practice where mutual fund managers 
belatedly load up on stocks that have performed well in the recent 
past, can be explained along similar lines.204  Unsophisticated 
shareholders considering their fund portfolios may look more 
favorably on managers holding an array of stocks that have been 
doing well.  In reviewing their fund’s holdings, however, there is 
usually no way for these investors to know that the shares were 
purchased too late for the funds to have benefited from their run-up in 
price.205 
These practices are not only misleading; they also show that fund 
managers are pursuing goals distinct from and contrary to the 
sophisticated stock analysis that is central to the arbitrage process.  In 
choosing a stock, fund managers likely weigh their evaluations of the 
optimal arbitrage strategy against agency-related concerns, like the 
fear of straying too far away from their peers.  This constrained 
pursuit of arbitrage opportunities provides another reason why share 
mispricings, or even severe market bubbles, may go unchallenged. 
(2)  Bounded Rationality of Arbitrageurs 
The assumption that sophisticated investors are rational hides still 
more.  The section above showed that, when we look at arbitrageurs 
as institutions with shareholder constituents, other reasons to doubt 
the arbitrage process emerge.  When we acknowledge that the 
decision makers at these institutions are human beings rather than the 
homo economicus of economic models, we confront a new set of 
potential barriers to EMH.  If sophisticated investors think like the 
rest of us, then there is nobody left to ensure a rational and orderly 
market. 
In fact, there is a relatively new, but growing, body of evidence 
that suggests that the decision making of financial experts is far from 
perfect.  In finance, we condemn average investors because, as 
discussed above, it has been shown that their thinking is marred by 
various biases.206  Research shows, however, that these same biases 
impact the decision making of financial professionals, sometimes 
even to a greater extent.  Below are a few examples. 
 
204 See id. at 13; see generally Iwan Meier & Ernst Schaumburg, Do Funds Window 
Dress? Evidence for U.S. Domestic Equity Mutual Funds (May 1, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://neumann.hec.ca/pages/iwan.meier/window050106.pdf 
(empirical study showing mutual fund window dressing). 
205 See Meier & Schaumburg, supra note 204, at 2. 
206 See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
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One of the most troubling aspects of naïve investor decision 
making is that they place too much emphasis on recent performance 
history.  They project future returns based on immediate past returns, 
which are not indicative.  Evidence exists, however, that suggests 
experts do the same thing.207  One study looked at how analysts 
reacted to a lower-than-expected earnings statement from Intel.208  
The statement caused a nearly thirty percent drop in the company’s 
share price,209 and numerous analysts shifted their recommendations 
from buy to sell.210  Neither of these aftereffects was justified by a 
fundamental analysis of the stock, taking into account the earnings 
announcement.211  The study’s author concludes that the analysts 
behaved as they did because they were making buy or sell 
recommendations based on recent price movements rather than on 
fundamental analysis—as Intel went up, they said “buy,” once it 
started dropping, they said “sell.”212  Stock recommendations based 
on such logic add noise to the market rather than eliminate it.213 
Another concern about ordinary investors is the disposition effect.  
Biased weighing of gains and losses causes these investors to shy 
away from selling shares that have dropped in value, while they part 
with good investments too early.214  This practice cuts into returns 
and creates noise in the marketplace—noise that would persist if 
professionals suffered from the same bias.  And it appears that they 
do.  Multiple studies have shown the disposition effect across a broad 
range of investment professionals.  In one study, the authors 
summarize that “[t]he disposition effect affects individual investors, 
home buyers, futures traders, professional account managers, 
experimental laboratory subjects, proprietary stock traders, and 
financial institutions.”215 
 
207 See John C. Easterwood & Stacey R. Nutt, Inefficiency in Analysts’ Earnings 
Forecasts: Systematic Misreaction or Systematic Optimism?, 54 J. FIN. 1777, 1797 (1999) 
(listing studies showing this phenomenon). 
208 See Bradford Cornell, Is the Response of Analysts to Information Consistent with 
Fundamental Valuation? The Case of Intel, 30 FIN. MGMT. 113 passim (2001). 
209 See id. at 113. 
210 See id. at 132. 
211 See id. at 121–32. 
212 See id. at 132–33. 
213 See id. at 133 (noting how the procyclical nature of such recommendations can 
exacerbate price swings). 
214 See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
215 Lei Feng & Mark S. Seasholes, Do Investor Sophistication and Trading Experience 
Eliminate Behavioral Biases in Financial Markets?, 9 REV. FIN. 305, 305 (2005); see also 
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Finally, average investors have been shown to be overconfident.  
They think that their estimates are more accurate than they really are, 
they are overoptimistic, and they have inflated opinions of 
themselves.216  Unfortunately, it has been shown repeatedly that 
investment savvy does not immunize people from overconfidence.217  
One recent study compared overconfidence among traders and 
investment bankers at large banks with that of students.  The 
professionals were consistently more overconfident—the difference 
was usually significant.218  Decision making impacted by this bias 
potentially results in limited searches, under-diversification, 
insufficient hedging, and a failure to learn from past mistakes—all of 
which are detrimental to stock picking. 
Along the same lines, Robert Shiller conducted a study that 
demonstrated both overconfidence in sophisticated investors and, 
more generally, that they process information intuitively rather than 
systematically.219  After the October 19, 1987, stock market crash, he 
sent out questionnaires to wealthy individual investors and 
institutional investors asking about their thinking on the day of the 
crash.220  About thirty percent felt “they had a pretty good idea when 
a rebound was to occur.”221  When asked about their supporting 
rationale for these bold statements in a time of such uncertainty, 
Shiller describes their responses as “merely intuitive.”222  He writes 
that “[t]hey spoke of gut feelings, of vague comparisons with past 
events, or of a sense that market psychology had changed.”223  This is 
consistent with accounts from within the industry and psychological 
research more generally, which suggests that decisions are the result 
 
id. at 305 n.1, 340–41 app.A.  Apart from listing empirical evidence for the disposition 
effect, this study itself is interesting in that it shows that sophisticated investors are more 
willing to recognize losses, but are still anxious to sell stocks appreciating in value.  See id. 
at 306–07. 
216 See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text. 
217 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 15–16; see, e.g., J. Edward Russo & Paul 
J.H. Schoemaker, Managing Overconfidence, 33 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 7 (1992) (finding 
overconfidence in money managers as well as other industries). 
218 See Markus Glaser et al., Overconfidence of Professionals and Lay Men: Individual 
Differences Within and Between Tasks? 5–6 (Apr. 26, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=712583. 
219 See SHILLER, supra note 148, at 379–402. 
220 See id. at 390. 
221 Shiller, supra note 144, at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of gut feelings and intuitive weighing rather than probabilistic, 
computer-like analysis.224 
There are also grounds to suspect that sophisticated investors, like 
ordinary investors, are susceptible to fads and rumors.  As the 
economist Benjamin Friedman points out, 
[t]here is simply no reason to believe that institutional investors are 
less subject to . . . social influences on opinion than other investors, 
and there are substantial grounds for thinking that they may be even 
more so . . . .  [A]part from a few lonely Warren Buffetts, 
institutional investors exist in a community that is exceptionally 
closely knit by constant communication and mutual exposure.225 
This sentiment has been echoed by Shiller, who argues that “[t]he 
complex judgments that institutional investors and portfolio managers 
must make . . . [are] inevitably influenced by the judgments of 
others.”226  He contends that investment “[p]rofessionals ultimately 
end up assuming that what their colleagues believe is true.”227  These 
descriptions of the industry cast further doubt on the decision making 
of financial experts.  Like ordinary investors, they too may be moved 
to action by social contagions rather than rigorous analysis. 
All of this suggests that there is good reason to suspect that 
sophisticates, like ordinary investors, make biased, fad-based, 
intuitive decisions.  It would be an overstatement, however, to dismiss 
their role completely.  Despite their bounded rationality, it still stands 
to reason that sophisticated investors make better decisions than 
average ones.  After all, the notion of the sophisticated investor 
encompasses more than purely rational thinking: it captures the idea 
that these investors have the training, intelligence, experience, 
aptitude in the field, and access to information that equips them to 
make more sound decisions, even if their choices are not perfectly 
rational.  What the research shows, however, is that it is also an 
overstatement to suggest that sophisticates and ordinary investors 
stand at polar ends of a spectrum.  Additionally, and most importantly 
for our purposes, evidence of these decision-making flaws poses yet 
another reason to doubt that sophisticate arbitrage ensures correct 
market prices. 
 
224 See id. at 25. 
225 Shiller, supra note 86, at 507–08. 
226 Shiller, supra note 144, at 21. 
227 Id. 
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The above analysis provides a multitude of theoretical reasons to 
doubt the notion that stock prices are accurate.  Standing in the way 
are the risks and costs of arbitrage, legal, practical, and institutional 
constraints and concerns, as well as the bounded rationality of both 
ordinary and sophisticated investors.  In the face of these concerns, it 
would be too much to say with confidence that the equilibrium price 
that we see in the market is an accurate one.  A better description is 
that stock prices are inaccurate, with the extent of the inaccuracy 
being a function of how these constraints are interacting with and 
influencing the arbitrage process at any given time. 
c.  Empirical Findings 
Milton Freedman argued that a theory should not be judged by 
whether the assumptions on which it is based appear true, but by 
whether it works in practice.228  According to this line of thought, the 
theoretical challenges to the premises of EMH so far discussed are 
incomplete without empirical backup.  We can list infinite reasons 
why EMH should not hold true, but if it works, it works.  Unless we 
can cast doubt on its empirical underpinnings, theoretical questions 
are interesting but insufficient.  With this in mind, much work has 
been devoted to looking at EMH empiricism with fresh eyes. 
As mentioned initially, the primary pieces of evidence in favor of 
EMH have been event studies and findings that mutual funds have 
failed to outperform the market.229  More recently, scholars have 
begun to reevaluate this research.  Event studies had shown that stock 
prices react quickly to news events.  This quick reaction is argued to 
be accurate based on the assumption that an over- or underreaction 
would create an arbitrage opportunity that rational traders would 
quickly exploit.  Behavioralists challenge the notion that this price 
equilibrium is necessarily rational.230  This new equilibrium may be 
irrational but remain in place because, for instance, it is too costly or 
risky for sophisticated traders to bet against it.  These scholars also 
question the stability of the post-event equilibrium.  They note that 
typically there is some lingering adjustment after news events (prices 
 
228 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 8–9, 23 (1953). 
229 See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text. 
230 See Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental 
Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591, 596–97 (1986). 
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tend to underreact in the short run and then overreact in the long 
run).231 
Similarly, behavioralists have challenged the implications of 
findings that show the failure of mutual funds to deliver excess 
returns.232  It may not necessarily be the case that efficiency is what 
makes market-beating mutual funds so difficult to find; there are 
multiple possibilities unrelated to efficiency that could explain this 
result.  One is that managers are unable to beat the market because 
noise traders defeat their elegant trading strategies.  Another is that 
they fail to see mispricings because their judgment is clouded by 
bounded rationality and peer pressure.  In sum, it could be the forces 
of inefficiency, rather than the forces of efficiency, that make active 
investing so difficult.233 
It is one thing to question empirical evidence of efficiency; it is 
another to show that the stock market is inefficient.  But this stronger 
empirical case has also been made.  The evidence comes in two 
forms.  First, scholars have noted many specific pricing anomalies.  I 
already mentioned the 3Com puzzle, the twin-shares puzzle, and the 
closed-end fund puzzle.234  But there is also evidence of broader 
anomalies.  For example, value stocks have historically performed 
better than growth stocks, and, until the 1990s, stocks as a whole 
mysteriously went up each January.235 
The relevance of these findings is debatable, however.  On the one 
hand, EMH proponents contend that these isolated findings say little 
about whether the market as a whole is efficient.236  In fact, one could 
argue that, if these anomalies are all behavioralists can find, the 
market must be pretty remarkable.  The counterargument is that if the 
market is not efficient even in these examples, then when is it 
efficient?  Consider the twin-shares puzzle.  In this instance, shares 
with fundamentally related cash flows trade on different exchanges 
for prices that are totally out of sync with each other.  This 
phenomenon is pretty stunning because the situation presents as close 
 
231 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 112–14. 
232 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 3–4.  Some research also suggests that 
some mutual fund managers may have some stock-picking ability.  See, e.g., Russ 
Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition into Stock-Picking 
Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses, 55 J. FIN. 1655 (2000). 
233 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 3–4. 
234 See supra notes 177–81 and 183–84 and accompanying text. 
235 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 18–19. 
236 See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 115, at 11 & n.8. 
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to a pure arbitrage opportunity as could likely exist in the real world, 
yet even here prices appear irrational.237 
Because fair points can be made on each side, without further 
evidence, the empirical claim that markets are actually inefficient 
would appear thin.  There are studies that revolve around market 
volatility, however, that are much more difficult to dispute.  If the 
stock market is efficient, this means that stock prices are accurate.  As 
I stressed earlier, however, if stock prices are accurate, then they 
would move only in response to newly revealed, relevant 
information.238  Nothing else would come into play.  Numerous 
studies show, however, that stock-price volatility stems from much 
more than information alone. 
For instance, EMH tells us that a stock’s price should not move 
when it is added to the S&P 500 index.239  This is because joining the 
index reveals no additional information.240  But this is not the case.  
Stocks go up in value when they are first included.241  This may not 
seem like much, but it indicates that more than just information is 
incorporated into a stock’s price.  The notion that something else is 
impacting prices has been confirmed by Shiller, who showed that, if 
information alone drove prices, the market would be five to thirteen 
times less volatile.242  In this same vein, a 1989 study found that 
many of the biggest one-day market moves took place on days 
without major news announcements.243  The October 19, 1987, crash, 
for instance, which, even after the extreme volatility in the fall of 
2008, continues to stake claim as the biggest percentage drop in the 
history of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, was accompanied by no 
news.244 
 
237 See Lamont & Thaler, supra note 181, at 265–66. 
238 See supra Part II.B. 
239 See SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 21–22. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. at 21–23.  America Online even rose eighteen percent.  Id. at 22. 
242 See Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent 
Changes in Dividends, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 433–34 (1981) [hereinafter Shiller, Stock 
Prices].  This study has been subject to a fair amount of debate.  See generally Robert J. 
Shiller, The Volatility Debate, 70 AM. J. AGRICULTURAL ECON. 1057 (1988). 
243 See David M. Cutler et al., What Moves Stock Prices?, 15 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 4 
passim (1989). 
244 SHLEIFER, supra note 86, at 20.  The 2008 turmoil pales in percentage terms.  See 
Peter A. McKay, Crisis Reverberates in Credit, Stock Markets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 
2008, at C1. 
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Similar findings have come from studies that look directly at the 
impact of information on price.  These studies have found that 
information actually explains a rather small percentage of price 
moves.  Richard Roll, for instance, found that micro- and 
macroeconomic information explained only twenty percent of daily 
movement.245  Such unexplained volatility lends substantial credence 
to the notion that the stock market is inefficient. 
The empirical debate over EMH is a tricky one.  Because we 
cannot say with certainty what the correct value of a stock should be, 
we cannot test directly whether stock prices are truly accurate.246  
This leaves both sides to rely on indirect evidence and inference to 
support their positions.  Given these limitations, however, the 
behavioralists seem to have gained the upper hand.  Evidence of 
pricing anomalies and excess volatility may not lead to a grand 
predictive theory of market behavior, but they are certainly difficult to 
square with EMH. 
In light of the above discussion, it no longer appears warranted for 
legal academics to point to accurate share prices as a mechanism of 
investor protection.  In fact, even though this section has presented 
both theoretical and empirical research that raises severe questions, it 
understates the case against this notion.  In the section below, I look 
at how the abstract and intangible nature of financial valuation calls 
into further question the veracity of the claim that stock prices are 
accurate. 
d.  The Epistemology of Finance and the Impact of Fat-Tail Events 
When EMH scholars and behavioralists debate accuracy, they are 
concerned with whether stock prices are society’s best guess of future 
earnings.247  This works as a common understanding on which to 
base debate, but it is a rather weak conception of accuracy.  Under 
this definition, stock prices can be accurate even if the predictions 
turn out to be remarkably far off.  If the risk and impact of faulty 
projections were low, this would be of little concern.  But research 
into epistemology and the influence of fat-tail events tells us that 
 
245 See Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. FIN. 541, 566 (1988). 
246 This is the so-called “joint hypothesis problem.”  See Lamont & Thaler, supra note 
181, at 228.  To judge whether a stock price is correct, one needs an accurate projection of 
future income streams and a model for how to discount those income streams to present 
value.  The Capital Asset Pricing Model traditionally fills the latter role, though it is 
contested.  See CARNEY, supra note 100, at 116–17. 
247 See Shiller, supra note 101, at 84–85. 
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significant failures to predict should be the norm rather than the 
exception.  Combine this with the healthy skepticism of stock prices 
that behavioral finance research engenders, and the proposition that 
prices are accurate in any meaningful sense of the word becomes truly 
enfeebled. 
According to EMH, the price of a security is ultimately determined 
by rational actors (either because everyone is rational or because 
sophisticated traders make up for the less savvy).248  When pricing a 
security, each of these rational actors constructs a probability 
distribution of the potential future incomes (based on potential future 
events) associated with the stock, discounts those figures back to 
present value, and then takes a weighted average to arrive at the 
rational price.249  Behavioralists contend that stock prices do not 
reflect this idealized conception.  But they do not traditionally note 
that this process can only possibly take into account what investors 
can foresee.  If some future event is unforeseeable, then it will not 
figure into a security’s price.  Another way to say this is that a stock’s 
price takes into account known unknowns but not unknown 
unknowns.250 
This is problematic because the things that have the biggest impact 
on stock prices are often unpredictable.  So-called “fat-tail events,” 
happenings that are extraordinarily important, yet unforeseeable a 
priori, transform individual companies and shape macroeconomics.251  
As a result, when they materialize, they profoundly affect corporate 
cash flows.  Because they are unpredictable, however, they do not 
figure into a trader’s ex ante probability distribution.  This dynamic 
has two related implications.  The first is that it stretches the meaning 
of accuracy to say that stock prices are “accurate” when they do not 
price these events.  The second is that, because stock prices fail to 
anticipate such events, they are a source of dramatic volatility.  
 
248 See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
249 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 561–62 (1984). 
250 This phraseology has been used by Richard Epstein in the employment context.  See 
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 969 
(1984). 
251 See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE 
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007).  Taleb describes fat-tail events as Black Swans.  See ESPEN 
GAARDER HAUG, DERIVATIVES: MODELS ON MODELS 8 (2007).  According to Taleb, the 
Black Swan “is mostly about the dynamics of history being dominated by . . . large scale 
events about which we know nothing.”  Id. 
 226 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 175 
Because traders are caught off guard, prices surge or collapse when 
these events occur.252  
A look at the last hundred years shows that the most transformative 
events were not foreseen.  For instance, pundits failed to predict the 
Great Depression,253 World War II,254 the rise of the Internet,255 or 
the most recent economic collapse.256  While it is tempting to blame 
this on the shortsightedness of experts, that conclusion misses what is 
likely the central causal phenomenon.  Experts and laymen likely fail 
to foresee fat-tail events such as these because epistemic constraints 
shield them from sight. 
The primary issue is that prediction is based on precedent.  But fat-
tail events like those just mentioned are unique and, therefore, cannot 
be predicted by looking to the past.  This is an example of the 
problem of induction—that history can never be a fail-safe guide to 
the future and can easily lead us astray.  The philosopher Karl Popper 
perhaps puts it best when he argues that “the observation of one 
unique process [cannot] help us to foresee its future development.  
The most careful observation of one developing caterpillar will not 
help us to predict its transformation into a butterfly.”257  More 
specifically, though less vividly, the historian H.A.L. Fisher has 
similarly opined that although “[m]en . . . have discerned in history a 
plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern . . . I can see only one 
emergency followed upon another . . . , only one great fact with 
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respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no 
generalizations.”258 
Although securities analysts may be able to look at a business plan, 
a product line, and a management team and thereby reach some 
estimate of a company’s future profits, they have no basis on which to 
predict the occurrence or impact of tectonic political or economic 
shifts that will swamp their micro-level findings.  This limitation on 
our ability to predict poses a further challenge to the notion that share 
prices are accurate.  Stock prices are supposedly based on predictions 
about future events.  But if the most important future events are 
unpredictable, then even a stock price that is “accurate,” in the sense 
that it is society’s best guess of the future, is only accurate in the 
weakest sense of the word.  Indeed, one begins to wonder whether the 
notion of accurate stock prices is a chimera.  How can we ever really 
say a stock price is accurate when, at any time, it could dramatically 
surge or falter as the next unforeseen fat-tail event materializes? 
2.  Implications for Investor Protection 
In first arguing that securities regulation could be understood as a 
mechanism for protecting investors from volatility, I noted that there 
are two possible ways to characterize how the regulatory structure 
contributes to this endeavor.  On the one hand, we could claim that 
accurate stock prices, which come about thanks in part to mandated 
disclosures, are what protect investors from volatility.  On the other 
hand, we could make the more modest claim that disclosure renders 
stock prices more accurate and, therefore, less volatile, while making 
no declaration that stock prices are indeed accurate. 
We are now in the position to conclude that the latter is the more 
appropriate characterization.  The statement that stock prices are 
correct does not appear to be true.  Nor does it even appear to be a 
useful approximation.  Modern theoretical and empirical work 
suggests that market prices result from the interaction of a complex 
set of factors and that, because of this dynamic, the prices that 
materialize may greatly diverge from fundamentals.  On top of that, 
the equilibrium price that emerges is inherently unstable.  It is capable 
of swinging wildly as unpredicted events unfold.  Indeed, our inability 
to predict suggests that, even if the stock market were perfectly 
 
258 H.A.L. FISHER, 1 HISTORY OF EUROPE vii (1935), quoted in POPPER, supra note 
257, at 109 (emphasis removed) (alteration in original). 
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efficient, share prices could only be accurate in a troublingly 
superficial sense of the word. 
The weaker claim that disclosure offers some protection from 
volatility, however, remains intact.  I argued that disclosure 
theoretically improves stock-price accuracy and reduces volatility by 
crowding out noise and allowing for better guesses about future 
events.  Nothing I have discussed thus far should cause us to abandon 
this notion.  The above analysis suggests that it is an 
oversimplification to think that all the information produced through 
SEC disclosures is immediately and rationally incorporated into price.  
But we should not jump to the conclusion that the information simply 
disappears into the ether.  From a behavioral finance perspective, 
information remains an accuracy-inducing force.  But because market 
processes are imperfect, prices remain inaccurate, even in an 
informationally rich environment.  Thus, it makes sense to think of 
disclosure as improving relative stock-price accuracy, even though 
the EMH ideal remains beyond reach.  Indeed, this is the view that 
has the strongest empirical support.  On the one hand, there is much 
evidence that stock prices remain inaccurate.259  On the other, we 
have evidence that the advent of disclosure has rendered stock prices 
more accurate than they were prior to regulation.260  Cumulatively, 
this evidence suggests that disclosure has a positive impact on 
accuracy, but perfection remains elusive.  Phrased in terms of 
volatility, what all of this means is that securities regulation tempers 
price swings, even though significant turbulence, stemming from both 
new information and investor sentiment, remains. 
C.  Managing the Risk That Remains 
I began this Article with the claim that securities regulation is best 
thought of as part of a broader risk-management framework.  The 
section above was devoted to properly characterizing the contribution 
that securities regulation makes to this endeavor.  The section below 
is devoted to developing a broader picture of societal risk 
management.  This involves describing the market risk that remains 
and analyzing how exogenous mechanisms help investors control it. 
We know that, despite the presence of securities regulation, the 
market remains highly volatile.  Describing this volatility, however, is 
surprisingly difficult.  One traditional measure is the standard 
 
259 See supra Part II.B.1.c. 
260 See supra notes 105–13 and accompanying text. 
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deviation of annual returns, which is 19.5%.261  What this figure 
means is that, in two out of three years, we should expect returns to be 
within 19.5% of the market’s average return.262  Market moves of 
more than one standard deviation should be rare, moves of more than 
two should be rarer still, and so on. 
This is a wide range, particularly when compared to other 
traditional asset classes, but it actually understates market risk.263  
What is outstanding about the stock market—and what this statistic 
glosses over—is the significant amount of daily volatility.  Although 
many trading days are uneventful, extraordinary rises and vertiginous 
falls arise with relative frequency.  One way to see the market’s 
tendency toward the extreme is to compare the spread of daily returns 
to a so-called normal distribution (that is, a bell curve).  When we do 
so, we see that stock market returns are much wilder.264  For instance, 
if returns were normally distributed, a price change of more than five 
standard deviations on one day would be expected to happen only 
once every seven thousand years. In reality, however, they happen 
once every three or four years.265  If the stock market behaved like a 
normal distribution, the October 1987 collapse, a twenty-five-
standard-deviation event, would have never occurred.266  Because the 
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market is marked by these large one-day moves, its returns 
distribution is said to have fat-tails.267  Though we do not have a 
well-accepted measure to intuitively represent how these fat-tails 
impact investors, we know that the abrupt swings wreak havoc with 
their returns.268  While disclosure may take away some volatility, we 
can see that much remains—even more than usually stated. 
To get a complete portrait of the extent to which investors are 
exposed to such market swings, we need to look at the exogenous 
mechanisms available to them to manage it.  Currently, we do not 
have government institutions designed to shield investors from market 
risk.  Instead, we have embraced a largely market-based response.  
The mutual fund is one of the most successful financial innovations of 
the century.  Today, thousands of these funds compete for the trillions 
of dollars that average Americans squirrel away for retirement.269  
Part of their popularity no doubt owes to the usefulness of the mutual 
fund concept.  But in an important sense, this robust marketplace is a 
government creation.  The Investment Company Act of 1940 and the 
regulations thereunder govern nearly every detail of mutual fund 
operations.270  The extensive regulation makes mutual funds a 
relatively benign and, therefore, popular way for ordinary investors to 
hold financial assets.  Tax policy also contributes to their success.  
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Current rules give individuals a substantial tax break for putting 
money into mutual funds via their 401(k) plans.271 
Though it has not been traditionally conceptualized as such, this 
government-supported mutual fund marketplace can be seen as the 
second leg of today’s risk-management structure.  By taking 
advantage of the offerings in this market, individuals can manage risk 
themselves through time and portfolio diversification.  In the 
following sections, I flesh out these two asset-management techniques 
and analyze how much insulation from risk they provide. 
1.  The Uncertainty of Time Diversification 
Time diversification is the notion that short-term stock market 
volatility is irrelevant for the long-term investor.272  According to this 
theory, the volatility washes out over an investing life span, and, 
therefore, investors should expect the market return—a healthy 7.6% 
per year.273  If one accepts this account, time diversification 
represents a robust mechanism for managing stock market risk—over 
time, the risk essentially vanishes.  Investors can take advantage of 
this principle by putting their money in equity mutual funds and then 
leaving it there for many years. 
Much of financial planning advice is based on time 
diversification,274 and the SEC has given its implicit endorsement.  
On the SEC’s Web site, for instance, the agency provides the 
following “Investor Tip”: 
Historically, the investment that has provided the highest average 
rate of return over the long term has been stocks.  But there are no 
guarantees of profits when you buy stock.  Markets go up and 
markets go down in the short-term.  That’s why it is best to think 
long-term when considering stock market investments.275 
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Much like EMH, however, though the notion of time 
diversification is intuitively appealing, it is deeply flawed.  Time 
diversification is ostensibly based on the law of large numbers, which 
tells us that, the more times one observes a random event (for 
example, rolls of a die), the closer the mean (in this example, the 
average number shown on the die) will come to the expected value (in 
this case, 3.5).276  As applied to the stock market, this would mean 
that, if investors put money in the market over the course of many 
years, their returns, though they may be positive or negative in any 
given year, should approach the market return over time.  Indeed, it 
has been shown that market returns over longer time periods, for 
example thirty years, tend to hover relatively close to the market’s 
historical mean.277 
All of this should give investors little comfort, however.  As a 
threshold matter, the 7.6% figure for market returns is misleading.  
Although this may represent the market average, it is an invalid 
reference point because it does not reflect what investors actually 
earn.  Because investors must pay investment-management fees and 
other expenses and because they serially mistime the market by 
buying high and selling low, the actual average investor return is 
substantially less.278  Over the last twenty years, for instance, returns 
for the S&P 500 index were safely in excess of inflation, but returns 
for investors in S&P 500 index funds lagged behind this key 
metric.279 
Moreover, it does not follow that risk is actually reduced just 
because the spread of returns around the long-term market average 
decreases over time.  Despite this statistical phenomenon, risk does 
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not go away; in fact, it may very well increase in the long term.  One 
source of risk is the uncertainty of future returns.  When we roll a die, 
we know the expected value is 3.5.  We do not know the expected 
value of the stock market.  Though the market has returned 7.6% in 
the past, there is no guarantee that this will be its average fifty or one 
hundred years from now.  In fact, U.S. equities have had a uniquely 
successful run as compared to other countries.280  A recent article 
looks at how the uncertainty of the future impacts stock market risk.  
It shows that, because the future is so uncertain, the longer one holds 
stocks the riskier they become.281 
Perhaps the biggest flaw in the time-diversification argument, 
however, is that it only focuses on the probability of losing money 
over time rather than the severity of potential losses.282  In the long 
term, although it becomes rarer to have returns that depart 
significantly from the market average, the chance of this occurring 
still exists, and, should a bad string of years materialize, unfortunate 
investors would have severe losses.  For example, let us say that the 
stock market drops ten percent each year for ten years.  This should 
be rather rare, but if it happens, investors lose sixty-five percent of 
their original investment.  What this shows is that, in exchange for the 
decreased chance of losses, investors are subject to increased severity 
of losses should they occur.  In other words, risk does not go 
anywhere; it merely changes shape.  The Nobel Prize-winning 
economist Paul Samuelson shows that, to utility-maximizing investors 
with constant relative risk aversion, the decreased likelihood of loss is 
offset by the increased severity, and therefore, time should have no 
effect on financial planning.283  Zvi Bodie has gone one step further.  
He argues that a measure that captures both the likelihood and 
severity of potential losses is the price of insuring against lackluster 
 
280 See Henry T. C. Hu, Faith in Magic, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 825–30 (2000). 
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Run? (May 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
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A. SAMUELSON 153, 157 (Joseph E. Stiglitz ed., 1966). 
283 See id. at 155; Paul A. Samuelson, Lifetime Portfolio Selection by Dynamic 
Stochastic Programming, 51 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 239, 240 (1969); Paul A. 
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[hereinafter Samuelson, Equities].  Others have argued for a more dynamic notion of 
utility in this context.  See, e.g., Christian Gollier, Time Diversification, Liquidity 
Constraints, and Decreasing Aversion to Risk on Wealth, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 1439 
passim (2002). 
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stock performance.284  Bodie shows that the price of insurance 
actually goes up over time, indicating that risk actually increases over 
longer time horizons.285 
Looking merely at the convergence of returns to the mean also 
ignores the dramatic impact of the timing of price swings.  A market 
collapse when one is young and has contributed little into a retirement 
account has little monetary impact.  But a collapse after a lifetime of 
investing, as experienced by would-be retirees in the fall of 2008, is 
disastrous.286  A bull market followed by an ill-timed drop could play 
a particularly cruel joke on long-time investors.  Anticipating future 
healthy returns, they may have cut their retirement contributions, only 
to see their savings severely diminished and the opportunity to have 
contributed more long gone.  Long-term investing does nothing to 
reduce the risk or consequences of such ill-timed market moves. 
Finally, studies have shown that time diversification leaves 
investors exposed to a great degree of risk.  A study by the Brookings 
Institution, which assumed steady contributions to a pure equity 
portfolio over a forty-year term, found that different investors had 
vastly different savings as a result purely of the market’s performance 
during their investing lifetimes.287  The luckiest investors had seven 
times more savings—due to chance alone—than the unluckiest 
investors.288  The study also showed the dramatic impact of recent 
events: the age demographic set to retire at the end of 2008 saw their 
savings drop dramatically.289  In light of the numerous theoretical and 
empirical problems with the notion that risk decreases over time, our 
reliance on time diversification as a mechanism for managing risk 
appears misplaced. 
2.  The Limits of Portfolio Diversification 
Portfolio diversification rests on sounder footing.  If investment 
portfolios include not only equities but also other types of 
investments, then a stock market decline would have a more muted 
impact on total returns.  Theoretically, therefore, investors can choose 
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the amount of market risk they wish to bear.  This is a very neat 
solution, but as I point out below, in practice, relying on portfolio 
diversification ends up leaving many investors very exposed. 
As mentioned above, we currently encourage people to invest in 
mutual funds through tax-favored retirement plans.290  In these 
retirement accounts, investors have the option to spread their money 
among stock, bond, and cash mutual funds and, in so doing, control 
their exposure to the market’s swings.  The truth, however, is that 
many investors do not understand the opportunity being presented to 
them.  A poll of mutual fund investors found that “less than half” 
knew that “the purpose of diversification is to balance both risk and 
return.”291  Another forty-five percent erroneously believed that 
diversification guarantees equity investments against stock market 
declines.292 
Given the lack of understanding, it is no surprise that evidence of 
actual diversification is equally underwhelming.  One study found 
that “diversification across asset categories was the exception rather 
than the rule.”293  Particularly disturbing is that this study found that 
approximately thirty percent of those between the ages of fifty-five 
and sixty-four and approximately twenty percent of those over sixty-
five had the entirety of their portfolio invested in equities.294  Another 
study produced results in the same vein.  It showed that one-half of 
401(k) participants have either all (or nearly all) of their money in 
equities or none of it.295  Finally, still other studies have shown that, 
when investors do diversify, they do so naively, spreading their 
investments evenly over all of the funds offered to them by their 
employer296 or across three or four funds.297 
Perhaps the realization that ordinary investors are not properly 
diversified should not come as a surprise.  Building a properly 
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diversified portfolio is the stuff of sophisticated financial theory.298  It 
is likely a bit much to expect investors to bring this to bear as they 
periodically sit down to look at their 401(k) statements.  Investors, 
however, need not attempt to diversify on their own.  Within the last 
decade, mutual funds have come out with so-called “life cycle funds” 
that both diversify investor money across asset classes and rebalance 
investor portfolios as they age, moving them from riskier to more 
conservative allocations. 
The problem here is that even these funds provide little protection 
from the market’s swings.  Building on the Brookings Institution’s 
study, Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research ran an 
experiment to see how effectively the diversification provided by 
these funds protects investors from market volatility.299  The 
experiment calculated the accumulated earnings for different 
retirement dates assuming that investors put six percent of their salary 
in these funds consistently for forty years.300  What the researchers 
found was uninspiring.  For instance, retirees in the 1980s would have 
accumulated less than one-half as much as those who retired in the 
1960s; 2008 retirees, two-thirds as much.301  Thus, even those savvy 
enough to put their money in life cycle funds leave much to chance. 
In theory, portfolio diversification could serve as a means of 
protecting investors from market risk.  But the setup we have today, 
where investors are supposed to either choose a diversified portfolio 
themselves or take part in life cycle funds, leaves many largely at the 
market’s mercy. 
III 
ASSESSING SOCIETAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
We now have a well-developed picture of how society manages 
market risk.  Securities regulation tames a portion of the market’s 
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volatility, but it leaves much unaccounted for.  If investors are 
uncomfortable with what remains, they can diversify their portfolios.  
Time diversification is of dubious value, but diversification among 
asset classes is a way for ordinary investors to contain market 
volatility.  At this point, we can ask whether this framework is 
satisfactory, and, if not, what types of reforms are the most promising. 
We are unlikely to achieve consensus as to the ideal risk-
management framework.  We can, however, look back at the work of 
Rawls and Harsanyi to help guide analysis of the issue.  Previously, I 
relied on their insights as theoretical support for the notion that it is in 
society’s interest to help investors manage risk.  But their works also 
explore what the ideal risk-management framework should look like. 
What is most difficult is determining how much protection from 
risk the government should endeavor to provide.  As is frequently the 
case in confronting difficult policy questions, one valid goal 
potentially conflicts with another.  In this case, the trade-off is 
between risk and return.  Oftentimes, measures that reduce volatility 
also reduce returns, and, while it is important to manage risk, it is also 
important not to undermine investor profits.  After all, no one would 
argue for a policy that led to a zero percent return, even if it left us 
with zero volatility.  Although protecting investors from volatility is a 
valid goal, the right societal outcome is ultimately the one where risk 
and return are in proper balance. 
Both Rawls and Harsanyi address the issue of how to strike this 
balance, albeit in a rather abstract manner.  Embedded in both of their 
theories of government are notions about the trade-off between 
inequality and utility, which is analogous to the trade-off in finance 
between risk and return.  Under Harsanyi’s framework, inequality is 
acceptable in an ideal society.  The correct amount is that which 
maximizes society’s utility given its aversion to risk.302  Rawls takes 
a different tack.  In general, his goal is to maximize the position of the 
least well off, but he recognizes that the sole pursuit of this objective 
could excessively crimp the overall welfare of society.303  Rawls 
solves this dilemma by positing that inequality is acceptable so long 
as it advances the welfare of the least advantaged.304  Under Rawls’s 
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conception, therefore, we would seek to eliminate inequality that does 
not also raise the standard of living for the less fortunate in society.305 
Thus, the only difference between the two is somewhat technical.  
Harsanyi sees utility as the end goal and, therefore, would not 
sacrifice societal utility to improve the well-being of the least 
advantaged, whereas Rawls would put egalitarianism above utility 
and would, therefore, sacrifice overall societal utility to set a higher 
floor for the least fortunate.  In applying this to finance, Harsanyi’s 
work suggests that he would accept the amount of volatility that 
would maximize societal welfare.  It appears that Rawls, on the other 
hand, would accept only so much volatility as is necessary to set a 
reasonable rate of return for the unluckiest investor. 
Neither of these abstractions tells us the exact rate of return and 
volatility that is acceptable for society.  But they do provide us with a 
framework for analysis.  Let us first look at today’s risk-management 
structure from a utilitarian perspective and ask whether it would 
appear to maximize societal well-being by setting the appropriate 
balance between risk and return.  Our current approach leaves much 
of this task to individual investors.  We can look at securities 
regulation as setting a default risk-return balance—that of the market, 
which has been rendered less volatile through disclosure.  If 
individuals do not like this balance, they can change it.  Most 
importantly, they can reduce their exposure to risk by diversifying 
their portfolios among various asset classes. 
The first question is whether the current risk-return trade-off 
offered by the market is a good baseline—that is, whether it is the 
balance many investors would choose.  We cannot know for sure, so 
any answer must be tentative.  Nevertheless, a fairly strong argument 
can be made that the market exposes individuals to too much risk.  
Market investments represent people’s retirement savings.  This is an 
endeavor where predictability counts for a lot.  The better people can 
forecast what they will have in the future, the better they can plan 
today.  Also, stock swings late in life can be devastating, emptying 
retirement accounts when the time for accumulation has largely 
passed.  In addition to these reasons why investors might prefer less 
volatility, we have some direct evidence as to people’s attitudes 
toward market risk.  In a recent study by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA), respondents evidenced strong risk 
aversion; twenty-six percent said they were unwilling to take any 
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risk.306  Similarly, a 1990s study concluded that “[m]uch of the public 
is intimidated by the stock market and frightened of its volatility.”307 
The beauty—at least theoretically—of today’s approach, however, 
is that, if people think the market exposes them to too much risk, they 
can diversify.  They can maximize their utility by adjusting the 
riskiness of their portfolios.  If investors are risk averse, they can 
invest in mutual funds featuring solely Treasury Bills.  If they are risk 
loving, then they can leave their money in equities.  This setup is 
attractive because of its flexibility.  If we are trying to maximize 
aggregate utility, it seems to make sense to let investors maximize 
their own, rather than mandating a one-size-fits-all structure.  In this 
market-based approach, government stands to one side as individuals 
choose whatever investments they favor. 
This approach only works, however, if both the supply and demand 
side of the market are functioning effectively.  Today, however, 
neither appears to be in good order.  On the supply side, we want the 
market to provide investment products that allow investors to design 
portfolios that effectively represent their preferences.  But today it is 
difficult for investors to do so.  The stock market is prone to wide and 
frequent swings, and investors have limited devices for dealing with 
them.  Time diversification is a deeply suspect concept, and 
diversification among asset classes only goes so far. 
The Brookings Institution’s study, mentioned earlier, vividly 
demonstrates how difficult it is for investors to dampen return 
volatility and the consequences they pay for doing so.308  The study 
shows that, over a forty-year period, if investors split their portfolio 
between stocks and bonds, they eliminate some volatility in exchange 
for giving up some potential returns, but much is still left to chance.  
For instance, retirees following this strategy, retiring in 1999, would 
have forty percent more than those retiring in 1993 and twice as much 
as those retiring in 2008.309  Investors who eschew the market 
entirely and invest solely in bonds would exchange the stock market’s 
volatility for the more tame fluctuations in the bond market.  Their 
returns, however, would be “considerably lower” and still subject to 
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chance.  Those retiring in 2008, for example, would have twice as 
much as those retiring in 1968.310  If such risk is unacceptable, 
investors can choose to leave their money in cash instruments, and, in 
that case, they would earn returns that barely keep pace with, or fall 
behind, inflation over time. 
What the market fails to provide is a way for investors to harness 
market returns while being shielded from its volatility.  The market 
has not, and perhaps cannot, provide this option, but the government 
likely can.  I will return to what government intervention along these 
lines might look like, but for now, it is enough to point out that the 
supply side of the market does not seem to offer investors overly 
satisfying alternatives relative to what could potentially be made 
available. 
The demand side of this market is also problematic.  Under our 
current approach, investors are supposed to divine their own perfect 
portfolios.  For this to work, we are coming perilously close to, if not 
outright assuming, that investors are rational actors.  We know, 
however, that this is not the case.  As discussed above, investors 
suffer from an array of decision-making flaws, and, by and large, they 
are financially unsophisticated.311  In this context, it has been shown 
that investors do not understand diversification and that they fail to 
take advantage of it.312  Because investors are not making asset-
allocation decisions that reflect fully informed rational preferences, 
they are failing to maximize their own utility and, by extension, that 
of society.  Rather than rely so extensively on the market, a risk-
management system that seeks to maximize utility would take asset-
allocation decisions out of the hands of ordinary investors or figure 
out a way to help them make better choices. 
Our current market-based approach fares even worse under a 
Rawlsian analysis.  It certainly does not set a high floor under the 
most unlucky.  Unfortunately timed investment decisions could lead 
to financial ruin.  More generally, an argument can be made that the 
current system, by making retirement savings dependent on individual 
investment savvy, broadens preexisting inequalities rather than 
responds to them.  People of higher intelligence and higher 
educational attainment already occupy elite and highly compensated 
ranks in our society.  Leaving it up to individual investors to properly 
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manage risk has the potential to further exacerbate this divide.  
Individuals who have less already are likely the ones who will 
construct the least efficient portfolios.313  Amplifying the inequity 
further is the tax subsidy for 401(k) plans, seventy percent of which 
goes to the top twenty percent of earners.314  All of this might be 
acceptable, even to Rawls, if allowing this divergence advanced the 
position of the least well off.  Without some type of floor under 
investing returns, however, it is hard to see how this is the case. 
In light of these misgivings, it is worth considering reforms to our 
current risk-management structure.  The essential problems appear to 
be that, despite mandated disclosures, the stock market likely harbors 
more volatility than the average investor prefers; the options available 
to investors for dealing with this volatility are limited; and investors 
are not doing a good job of taking advantage of their options, 
imperfect though they may be.  By addressing these concerns, we 
could design a risk-management system that is both fairer and more 
efficient. 
A.  Endogenous Mechanisms to Better Protect Investors 
One avenue of reform is to take aim at stock market volatility 
directly.  Perhaps better securities laws could improve share-price 
accuracy and, in doing so, reduce volatility.  Tackling volatility in this 
way would be especially nice because it would reduce risk for all 
investors—not just the savviest.  We might even be able to do so 
without overly dampening returns.  Prominent studies have shown 
that the introduction of the disclosure regime reduced volatility 
without impacting returns.315 
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If we are looking to improve stock-price accuracy, then traditional 
avenues of reform—namely, improved disclosure,316 investor 
education,317 and deregulation of certain investing limitations318—
remain relevant, for they are all well suited to this purpose.  In fact, 
they now have a solid intellectual foundation.  Previously, these were 
not grounded in any satisfactory theory about how securities 
regulations and, by extension, reforms to securities regulations, 
protect investors.  Now reforms along these lines can be justified as 
mechanisms to improve societal risk management.  The problem, 
however, is that, when we take another look at the reasons why stocks 
prices are off, we see that these reforms are unlikely to have much 
impact.  As discussed below, obstructions to share-price accuracy 
stem from largely ineradicable features of the market and biases that 
are likely ingrained in human decision making, rendering further 
endogenous regulatory responses largely ineffective. 
1.  Improved Disclosure 
If disclosure already improves stock-price accuracy, perhaps more 
disclosure would further advance this goal.  Like disclosures already 
in place, the additional information could make prices more accurate 
and less volatile by supplanting noise and allowing for better 
projections with respect to the topics covered.  The SEC continually 
adds more disclosure—perhaps we can defend this much-maligned 
practice along these lines. 
In the abstract, the above logic is sound.  But it is open to two 
practical challenges.  First, there is good reason to believe that 
sophisticates are already overloaded with information.319  Along these 
lines, we know that analysts already ignore much of the information 
available.320  Thus, it is unclear whether the additional information 
would actually be absorbed into the market.321  Second, even if the 
information were absorbed, its impact would likely be negligible.  
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Tides of investor sentiment are unlikely to recede because, for 
instance, a nuanced piece of information has been added to a lengthy 
disclosure form.  Likewise, more company-specific minutia is 
unlikely to help investors predict the next fat-tail event. 
Another popular reform recommendation is disclosure 
simplification.322  One could argue that more user-friendly 
disclosures would lead to better informed investors and, therefore, 
less noise in the marketplace.  To the extent this notion has in mind 
ordinary investors, however, it is unconvincing.  We have already 
recognized that it is wishful thinking to assume that average investors 
are reading SEC disclosures.323  It seems equally unrealistic to think 
that clearer sentences and fewer details will bring them back into the 
fold while at the same time equipping them with the information to 
competently assess stock values.  Pursuing this idealistic vision also 
potentially sacrifices informational richness, which in turn could 
make share prices less accurate.  The SEC can make sure that 
investors are given clear and accurate information by enforcing rules 
pertaining to the look and presentation of securities solicitation and 
sales documents.  But attempting to make SEC disclosures amenable 
to the average investor appears misguided. 
This does not mean, however, that SEC disclosures need to be 
legalistic, jargon-filled tomes.  Reforms that make it easier for 
sophisticated investors to process information are defensible.324  If 
information is easier for them to use, perhaps they will be able to 
bring more of it to bear on their decisions, which could potentially 
improve accuracy.  Again, however, the impact would at best be 
marginal.  It is difficult to see more streamlined and accessible 
presentation of the information currently required impacting irrational 
price swings or bringing unknown unknowns within their purview. 
The upshot is that we are already scraping up against the ceiling of 
what disclosure can accomplish.  Empirical evidence shows that 
disclosure has tamed a portion of the market’s volatility.325  Much of 
the volatility that remains, however, stems from sources that 
disclosure can do nothing to combat.  It is ineffective against 
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widespread investing fads and high impact, unpredictable events.  
Although we can make incremental improvements to our disclosure 
regime, stock prices would likely remain volatile and inaccurate even 
if we were to absolutely optimize our disclosure practices.326  To 
make a real dent in market volatility, we must look elsewhere. 
2.  Improved Investor Education and Efforts at De-Biasing 
The lack of investing knowledge and bounded rationality are key 
barriers to stock-price accuracy.  Prices would be more accurate if 
ordinary investors were more financially savvy and rational.  
Similarly, although we can assume that sophisticated investors are 
educated in their business, if we could improve the rationality of their 
decision making, we could improve share-price accuracy.  Given all 
of the above, investor education efforts aimed at ordinary investors 
and de-biasing efforts targeted more broadly seem to make sense.  
Like improving disclosure, however, there is probably not much 
upside from these reforms. 
Let us first consider investor education.  Prospects are dim.  
Understanding SEC disclosures and valuing securities are inherently 
complex tasks, and, for many, they are unwelcome.  Given this 
backdrop, it seems dubious that government-sponsored or 
government-supported efforts to impart the necessary know-how to 
the public would prove successful.  Moreover, average investors do 
not revisit their portfolios daily.  Because they focus on finance only 
from time to time, the chances are high that any knowledge gained 
through education would evaporate over a couple of years.327  While 
efforts to encourage increased saving or that teach the value of index 
funds may be helpful, anything beyond those would likely prove 
fruitless.328 
The prognosis for de-biasing is equally underwhelming.  The idea 
is that if we teach individuals about their biases, then they will not be 
captive to them.329  In the investing context, if people did not apply 
faulty decision-making heuristics to complex issues, perhaps they 
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compute fundamental value”). 
327 See Willis, supra note 146, at 216 (contrasting the “episodic” nature of financial 
decisions to other types of life choices). 
328 Even in Willis’s critique of financial literacy education, see id. at passim, she 
acknowledges that education may work if it is “simple, universal, and clear.”  Id. at 226. 
329 For a broader discussion of de-biasing, see id. at 249–53. 
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would better understand SEC disclosures and be more rational in 
valuing stocks.  The reasoning here is enticing, but to think we can 
improve investor rationality is probably overly optimistic.  The main 
problem is that biases are likely hardwired.  Neurobiology research, in 
fact, has begun to show that these biases are part of how the human 
mind is built.330  They serve as a way for us to organize and 
summarize information to deal with our cognitive limitations.331  It 
may not be so easy, therefore, to simply tell people to ignore their 
biases.  A thirty-minute Web-based training video is unlikely to erase 
millions of years of evolution.  Moreover, even if immediately after 
the training, investors recognize the ill of their past ways, by the time 
they turn to their portfolios months or years later, any lessons will 
likely have faded away. 
One illustration along these lines is the SEC’s effort to warn 
investors that past performance is not a trustworthy predictor of future 
performance.332  This can be seen as a de-biasing effort in that the 
goal is to prevent people from applying the representativeness 
heuristic, which would lead them to extrapolate continued high 
returns from a limited data set.  Despite warnings, however, investors 
continually overemphasize past returns in their decision making.333  
Given these theoretical and practical concerns, therefore, it appears 
highly speculative to argue that de-biasing would have an appreciable 
impact on investors. 
Perhaps the prognosis changes, however, if we focus on 
sophisticated investors.  Like all of us, they are hardwired with biases.  
 
330 See Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: 
Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1172–73 
(2001); The Endowment Effect: It’s Mine I Tell You, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2008, at 79; 
Gary Stix, The Science of Economic Bubbles & Busts, SCI. AM., July 2009, at 78; James 
Montier, Darwin’s Mind: The Evolutionary Foundation of Heuristics and Biases passim 
(Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=373321. 
331 See Herbert A. Simon, Invariants of Human Behavior, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 7 
(1990).  In this piece, Simon famously argues that “[h]uman rational behavior . . . is 
shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the 
computational capabilities of the actor.”  Id. 
332 See SEC, Form N-1A, OMB No. 3235-0307, at Item 4(b)(2)(i), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf (requiring a warning in mutual fund 
prospectuses); Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors: Divergent 
Profiles, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 934, 969 & n.128 (2008) (discussing warning 
required in mutual fund advertisements). 
333 See Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 
1589 passim (1998); Ronald T. Wilcox, Bargain Hunting or Star Gazing? Investors’ 
Preferences for Stock Mutual Funds, 76 J. BUS. 645, 650 (2003). 
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They do, however, have a greater incentive to overcome them.  After 
all, finance is their profession, and eliminating biases may give them 
an investing edge.  Thus, there is reason to think that they may be 
more receptive to de-biasing efforts.  But we should temper our 
enthusiasm.  Most disturbing are studies by Kahneman, Tversky, and 
others that demonstrate what are referred to as “errors of application.”  
What these studies show is that sophisticated subjects can 
demonstrate understanding of a decision-making rule but then fail to 
apply the rule in practice.334  This trait may explain why, for instance, 
even professional traders who should know better seem to be 
influenced by a stock’s recent past performance.335  That such errors 
of application exist suggests that biases may be sticky, even for 
experts.  Moreover, we should recognize that efforts at de-biasing 
sophisticated investors, even if they turn out to be a startling success, 
have a severely limited upside.  In attempting to fairly value 
securities, experts would still be unable to predict fat-tail events, and 
they would still contend with the limits to arbitrage that are the 
centerpiece of behavioral finance research.  These substantial sources 
of inaccuracy would remain. 
3.  Unwinding Legal Constraints to Arbitrage 
To make markets more efficient and thereby improve share-price 
accuracy, we could also consider easing legal restrictions that inhibit 
arbitrage.  Arguably, there should be no caps on leverage, short 
selling, or even so-called “naked short selling.”  With greater leverage 
and unencumbered short selling, the smart money could make bigger 
bets to offset irrational price swings. 
The problem is, however, that the added flexibility for this group of 
investors opens the door to other significant societal concerns.  One 
issue is that both leverage and short selling create negative 
externalities.  First, consider leverage.  Although a high debt load may 
be profitable for a sophisticated institutional investor like an 
investment bank or hedge fund, the concentration of risk in a single 
entity may pose a threat to the greater financial system (so-called 
 
334 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Study of Statistical Intuitions, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 140, at 493, 495, 
498; Rabin, supra note 146, at 31–32. 
335 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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“systemic risk”).336  Because the sophisticated investor would not 
fully internalize the risk to the financial system, there is a role for the 
government to place limits.  Indeed, the role of unchecked negative 
externalities is one of many themes stressed in narratives purporting 
to explain the financial collapse in 2008.337 
A similar dynamic is apparent with short selling.  Massive short 
selling can cause a stock’s price to drop precipitously.  If the 
company that is the subject of the attacks is important to the financial 
system, these short sales, although profitable for the traders, can 
impose risks to the greater financial system.  Again, 2008 proves 
illustrative.  The fear of this type of downward pressure on 
systemically important institutions was the SEC’s rationale for 
restricting short sales of financial companies in the latter half of that 
year.338 
Another problem is that, as discussed above, sophisticates are not 
perfectly rational339—and leverage, if used carelessly, can pose 
systemic risk.  Nor are they saints.  Many have alleged that short 
selling can be used, and has been used, to manipulate stock prices.  In 
particular, naked short selling is often viewed with concern.  Because 
naked short sales are not attached to actual shares, there is no limit to 
how many such trades can be made.340  This freedom creates the 
potential for a flood of sales on the market, which could depress a 
stock’s price artificially.341  Thus, although there is the potential of 
improving share-price accuracy through these measures, there are 
significant countervailing factors to consider. 
In addition, the upside is limited.  Even if we were to allow 
unlimited leverage and short selling, market prices would still likely 
 
336 See Viral V. Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 283, 284 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew 
Richardson eds., 2009). 
337 See id. at 285–88. 
338 See Emergency Order, supra note 175, at 42379. 
339 See supra Part II.B.1.b.ii.2. 
340 Naked short selling is currently regulated, but whether it is regulated successfully is 
a matter of debate.  See James W. Christian et al., Naked Short Selling: How Exposed Are 
Investors?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1033 (2006). 
341 This fear led the SEC, in the fall of 2008, to tighten its restrictions on naked short 
selling.  See Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-58572, 73 Fed. Reg. 54875, 54875 (Sept. 17, 2008); GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REGULATION SHO: RECENT ACTIONS APPEAR TO HAVE 
INITIALLY REDUCED FAILURES TO DELIVER, BUT MORE INDUSTRY GUIDANCE IS NEEDED 
1–2, 21–23 (2009). 
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be inaccurate.  Sophisticated investors would still face noise-trader 
risk and fundamental risk, remain irrational, and be no better at 
predicting fat-tail events.  In fact, increased leverage renders fat-tail 
events even more problematic.  Highly leveraged positions can 
backfire spectacularly—and have systemic consequences—when 
unforeseen fat-tail events materialize.342  In light of the potentially 
significant downsides and the limited upside of reduced legal 
constraints on these activities, they should only be embraced with 
caution. 
In the end, the potential for endogenous mechanisms to make share 
prices more accurate and, therefore, less volatile is dubious.  
Regulatory efforts continuously run up against what appear to be 
largely intractable barriers.  We are left, therefore, with a conservative 
view of both the role of securities regulation and its potential.  The 
rules improve accuracy and reduce volatility, but much remains, and 
there appears to be little that reforms can do about it. 
B.  Exogenous Institutional Responses 
If we cannot make the stock market itself much less volatile, 
perhaps we can at least do more to help investors manage their 
exposure to it.  Today, if investors are unsatisfied with the risk-return 
trade-off offered by the market, they must diversify their savings.  I 
argued earlier that this setup is suboptimal because diversification 
options are limited and many investors do not know how to take 
advantage of the ones that exist.  In the following sections, I set forth 
three ideas for improving upon this state of affairs.  The first focuses 
on better enabling investors to manage risk on their own.  The latter 
two discuss how volatility can be controlled through the creation of 
institutional arrangements that spread market risk more broadly. 
1.  Better Individual Risk Management 
One hallmark of today’s framework is that each investor bears 
market risk alone.  Investors keep whatever is in their portfolio—for 
better or worse.  This concentration of market risk may not be the 
optimal solution, and I turn to risk-sharing options in later sections.  
But were we to keep this individualistic paradigm, we could at least 
improve upon it by providing investors with better options for 
managing risk and guiding them toward sound decisions. 
 
342 See MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 252, at 105–07 (discussing the infamous 
collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management). 
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Today’s life cycle funds offer a good starting point for this 
analysis.  They seem to operate from a sound premise: because 
sophisticated investors are in a better position to put together correctly 
balanced funds, having them set up diversified funds for ordinary 
investors makes sense.  The problem, however, is that these 
sophisticated investors appear to have based these funds on the notion 
of time diversification.  The funds are heavily weighted toward 
stocks, especially initially, which leaves investors exposed to extreme 
volatility.343  Because the notion of time diversification is 
questionable at best, the focus should instead be on portfolio 
diversification. 
Along these lines, market risk would be reduced if these funds held 
less equity and more relatively safe assets, like bonds and cash.  
Benjamin Graham, for instance, in his classic, The Intelligent 
Investor, recommends a portfolio featuring roughly one-half bonds 
and one-half equities.344  We need not stop there, however.  It may 
also be beneficial for investors to have exposure to a wider array of 
investments, including nontraditional ones.  Alternative asset classes, 
like hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds, can 
offer returns uncorrelated with either stocks or bonds and, therefore, 
can improve the performance of a portfolio without adding to its 
riskiness.345  Institutional investors, most famously university 
endowments, have added these assets to their portfolios with success, 
not only earning higher returns than the stock market but also better 
weathering the recent economic tumult.346 
Though these instruments could similarly benefit average 
investors, today’s securities regulations have put them largely out of 
reach.347  Such rules are in place to protect ordinary investors from 
these more complicated instruments.  But there are ways we can 
permit access without compromising investor protection.  For 
 
343 See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text. 
344 See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 90 (rev. ed. 2003).  As in 
today’s life cycle funds, the allocation to equities could decrease over time.  This is 
because older investors have less ability to simply work harder and longer in order to make 
up for stock market losses.  See Samuelson, Equities, supra note 283, at 17–18. 
345 See SWENSEN, supra note 266, at 132; Schwartz, supra note 27, at 536 n.102. 
346 Yale’s endowment, for instance, earned a sixteen percent return in the last ten years, 
taking into account a twenty-five percent drop during the financial crisis.  The S&P 500 
earned two percent, enduring a thirty-two percent drop over the same time frame.  See 
Craig Karmin, Yale’s Investor Keeps Playbook, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2009, at C1. 
347 See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 531–32 (briefly summarizing rules that restrict 
investment in such vehicles). 
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example, we could loosen the investment company rules to make it 
easier for managers to include these types of investments, but set 
limits on the percent that funds can allocate to these instruments.  
Additionally, we could force hedge funds and the like that wish to be 
included to comply with a level of regulatory scrutiny that is higher 
than what they face today. 
It seems that revamped life cycle funds without their equity bias, 
but with some exposure to alternative assets, would strike a better 
risk-return balance for investors.  It is one thing, however, to outline 
the contours of a new fund template.  It is another to figure out how 
best to inject this innovation into the market.  A full discussion of the 
various implementation strategies is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but I will mention a few ideas.  The least invasive approach would be 
to educate investors about the benefits of broadly diversified funds in 
the hopes of creating demand for these products that would in turn 
lead to supply.  Whether such a hands-off approach would be 
effective, however, is open to question.  Doubts about whether 
investors are willing and able to absorb this information and about the 
government’s ability to effectively provide it, come to mind.  Rather 
than relying on an information and education campaign to stimulate 
demand, the government could get involved on the supply side.  It 
could encourage funds to provide these instruments, either through 
verbal prodding or by providing tax or other subsidies; it could even 
mandate that such funds be made available.  Still more aggressively, 
the government could directly enter the fray.  It could offer a broadly 
diversified fund in competition with the private-sector funds.  This 
competition could encourage imitation by industry. 
Direct government competition raises issues of institutional 
competence and capture, but these are not insoluble,348 and, given the 
less-than-competitive framework in the current mutual fund 
industry,349 this alternative should not be dismissed out of hand.  
Moreover, a construct where investors are allowed broader access to a 
wider array of investments and may choose a public option is similar 
to the pension scheme in Sweden, where investors are given the 
ability to self-direct their retirement savings, and one of the options 
 
348 See infra notes 386–90 and accompanying text (discussing the setup of Canada’s 
pension scheme, which involves direct government involvement). 
349 See Schwartz, supra note 27, at passim. 
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available for them is a government fund that includes alternative asset 
classes.350 
Even if the product is available, however, there is no assurance the 
public will participate.  Therefore, a plan to launch such a fund should 
also include a strategy for encouraging broad consumer acceptance.  
Again, there are a range of alternatives.  Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein argue that the government can change people’s behavior for 
the better without telling them what to do by pointing people in the 
right direction without limiting their options.351  One way to do this is 
by carefully setting defaults.352  Because defaults are sticky, the 
government can nudge people to good decisions by setting the default 
option as one that is likely a good choice for most people.353  In this 
context, this would mean setting improved life cycle funds (or even 
the government’s fund) as the default when employees enroll in their 
company’s 401(k) plan.354  Sweden’s experience suggests that this 
alone would be quite effective.  In Sweden, the government’s fund is 
the default, and the vast majority of employees leave their money in 
the fund unless actively encouraged to do otherwise.355  If we wish to 
further bolster participation, regulators could attempt to educate 
consumers about the benefits of these types of funds (although, as 
discussed earlier, there are significant limits to what we can expect 
people to absorb). 
The other option is a government mandate.  It is conceivable that 
these funds would be the only options made available for retirement 
 
350 See R. Kent Weaver, Design and Implementation Issues in Swedish Individual 
Pension Accounts, 65 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 38, 40 (2005), available at http://www.ssa.gov 
/policy/docs/ssb/v65n4/v65n4p38.pdf.  The default fund compares favorably to its 
competitors.  See Erik Jacobson & Björn Lundgren, The Swedish Premium Pension (Feb. 
19, 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Stockholm School of Economics), available at 
http://arc.hhs.se/download.aspx?MediumId=670. 
351 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4–6 (2008). 
352 See id. at 12–13. 
353 See id. 
354 Under the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 
(2006), employers are permitted to set life-cycle funds as an employee’s default 
investment.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(5) (2006); Ilana Polyak, 401(k), New and Improved, 
PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Nov. 24, 2008, at S10.  Increased regulation of life cycle 
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to be on inconsistent results and asset allocations among what should be similar 
investment instruments.  See Mark Bruno, Target Date Funds Seen as a Question of How 
Rather than if, INVESTMENT NEWS, June 29, 2009, at 10. 
355 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 351, at 148–49. 
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savings (or, more aggressively, that the government’s fund be the 
only available alternative).  One downside of these more restrictive 
alternatives is that a subset of individuals may have a reasonable 
reason for leaving their money in other funds.  If participation in 
revamped life cycle funds is easy and highly recommended, we may 
be able to garner a high level of participation without eliminating 
these alternatives. 
Questions of implementation aside, the main point is that investors 
would likely be better served if their savings were housed in more 
thoughtfully designed and thoroughly diversified mutual funds.  
There are limits, however, to what proper portfolio design can 
accomplish.  Even the most sophisticated asset managers endured big 
losses in 2008.356  As discussed below, we may be able to achieve a 
more optimal risk-return trade-off if we allow investors to share risk 
rather than forcing them to deal with it all within their own portfolio. 
2.  The Prospect of Insuring Returns 
Although we often conceptualize investing as far removed from 
insurance, investors insure their returns all the time, though we 
seldom call it that.  Diversification among asset classes, for instance, 
is analogous to insurance in that it allows individuals to narrow the 
range of potential investing outcomes.  By moving away from a 
complete equities portfolio, investors give up the chance of 
exceedingly high returns in exchange for protection from exceedingly 
low returns. 
Insurance provides the same type of trade-off.  Consider fire 
insurance.  If homeowners choose to leave their house uninsured, and 
their house does not burn down, then they have maximized their 
wealth.  But if the house were to burn down, then the owners would 
suffer severe losses.  By insuring, individuals trade the potential for 
the best outcome (not paying insurance and not having their house 
burn down) in exchange for protection from the worst (having an 
uninsured house burn down). 
Today, we generally expect investors to insure through portfolio 
diversification.  But investors could theoretically insure their portfolio 
just like they insure their house.  They could pay some type of 
insurance premium, or agree to forgo returns in excess of a certain 
percentage, in exchange for some type of returns floor, whether that 
 
356 See supra note 346 and accompanying text. 
 2010] Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk 253 
be return of capital, or some minimum profit.  This could give 
investors more certainty without overly compromising returns. 
Today, the opportunity to directly insure returns is quite limited.  
Private insurers offer so-called “equity-indexed annuities.”  These are 
complex insurance products that offer investors the opportunity to 
place a floor under stock market losses, usually at around ten 
percent.357  In exchange, the insurance companies charge fees and cap 
their investors’ upside.358  These products, although they achieve a 
risk-management function, come with two significant drawbacks.  
The first is that they are technically insurance products.359  This 
means that the insurer is contractually obligated to the insured to 
make good on the annuitized payments in retirement, which leaves 
investors subject to the risk of default stemming from the company’s 
bankruptcy or otherwise.360  Because saving for retirement is a long-
term endeavor, this is a significant consideration.  The second 
problem is that these products are extremely complex, giving rise to a 
significant risk that investors do not understand them.361  A better 
regulatory scheme, direct government intervention, or both, would 
offer the potential to improve on this state of affairs. 
The least interventionist approach would be to subject these 
instruments to disclosure requirements that make the material terms 
clearer to investors.362  Because the structures of these instruments 
are inherently complex, however, it seems dubious that rewriting 
sentences and adding diagrams would do much good.  Another option 
is to regulate the structure of these instruments.  The government 
could conceivably lay out the terms of a savings insurance product 
that would be nonabusive and challenge the industry to come up with 
 
357 For a fuller description of the return guarantee associated with these products, see 
Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Products; Final Rule, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-8996, 74 Fed. Reg. 3137, 3141 (Jan. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Indexed 
Annuities]; FINRA, Equity-Indexed Annuities––A Complex Choice, (Apr. 22, 2008), 
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/AnnuitiesAndInsurance/P01
0614 [hereinafter A Complex Choice]. 
358 See SEC, Equity-Indexed Annuities, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/equityidx 
annuity.htm (Dec. 19, 2008). 
359 See id. 
360 See A Complex Choice, supra note 357. 
361 See Indexed Annuities, supra note 357, at 3139 & n.13. 
362 Concerns about the complexity and marketing of these products have led the SEC to 
usher in increased regulation.  See id. at 3139.  Under the revised rules, if the insured bears 
the investment risk, the product will be treated as a security and will, therefore, be subject 
to disclosure and other rules.  See id. 
 254 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 175 
offerings that fit within these confines.  This is similar to the setup in 
Germany and Switzerland.  Both countries require that mutual funds 
guarantee the return of shareholder capital at retirement.363 
This market-based approach, however, is limited.  One problem is 
that insuring returns is a tough business.  Because of the uncertainty 
surrounding future stock returns, coming up with a meaningful, yet 
simple, insurance mechanism may be difficult for the private 
sector.364  This has been the case in Switzerland, where, because 
mutual funds are struggling to fund their guarantee obligations, the 
government has been forced to repeatedly lower the minimum return 
it requires them to provide.365 
Another weakness is the risk of default by the insuring entity.366  
Depending on a private institution to meet obligations potentially 
lying forty years in the future is a bit dubious.  Theoretically, the 
government could solve this problem by reinsuring the insurer.  One 
drawback of this approach, however, is that it would create moral 
hazard: the insuring companies would be incentivized to take on 
additional risks knowing that investor money is safe.  Our recent 
financial collapse, which sprang from risky practices by insurance 
companies, banks, and government-sponsored enterprises (like Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac) with implicit government guarantees, 
illustrates that this risk is real.367 
The way to avoid this problem is to have the government insure 
returns directly through a government-sponsored guaranteed-returns 
equities fund.  A recent Boston College study concluded that, over the 
last eighty-four years, the government could have guaranteed investor 
returns of six percent (investors in this case would have forfeited any 
 
363 See Manuel Ammann, Return Guarantees and Portfolio Allocation of Pension 
Funds, 17 FIN. MARKETS & PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 277, 277 (2003); Raimond Maurer 
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returns above six percent in exchange for a guarantee of at least that 
amount).368  This measures up favorably to life cycle funds, 
delivering higher returns for many investors without the volatility.369  
Investors retiring in the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for 
instance, would have fared far better under such a system.370 
Looking prospectively, the study concludes that, under certain 
assumptions, the government could offer a four percent returns 
guarantee with a six percent cap.371  The authors argue that because 
the government has certain advantages, like being able to cheaply 
borrow money, it could offer such a guarantee, whereas the risk 
associated with it would be too great for the private sector.372  In a 
fund of this type, the government would be acting essentially as a 
conduit through which risk is shared by generations.  Further research 
needs to be done to test these results with different methodologies and 
different assumptions.  And given the uncertainty of future market 
returns, any guarantee likely needs to be flexible.  Nevertheless, the 
results are intriguing. 
In theory, there are a few potential ways this fund could be 
presented to the public.  It could be presented as an alternative to 
private-sector funds, as the default fund in which investor money is 
placed when they enter a 401(k), or it could be the only option 
available.  The first two alternatives are attractive in that they allow 
for consumer sovereignty, but, because under these scenarios some 
investors may choose not to participate in the government fund, they 
raise significant fairness concerns.  The government may have to 
borrow or call on taxpayers to fund the return guarantees in years of 
stock market declines.373  This makes ensuring the fund’s success a 
societal obligation.  It would be fairer, therefore, if all of society stood 
 
368 See MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 261, at 4. 
369 See id. at 5 & fig.4. 
370 See id. at 5 & fig.5. 
371 See id. at 6–7.  One assumption is that the government is one-half as risk averse as 
private insurers.  Id. at 7.  The piece, however, acknowledges the uncertainty surrounding 
this figure.  See id. at 9 n.16. 
372 See id. at 7.  Among other things, the study points out that such an endeavor would 
be no different than other high-risk social programs, such as unemployment insurance.  
See id. 
373 The government could reduce its need to draw on outside resources by investing 
in—and guaranteeing—a diversified portfolio, rather than a pure equities portfolio.  
Hedging risk in this way, however, would likely reduce the overall societal return. 
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to benefit as well.374  Thus, the last option, although it places the 
greatest restriction on choice and an abundance of faith in the 
government’s capabilities, may be the best. 
More thought is necessary as to the structure, implementation, and 
feasibility of risk sharing along these lines.  At least in principle, 
however, the government insurance template offers the potential to 
improve upon our current framework, in which future market 
gyrations pose an omnipresent risk. 
3.  Rethinking Defined Benefits 
Another way to shield investors from market volatility is to key 
returns to lifetime wages rather than market returns.  Defined-benefit 
plans take this approach, guaranteeing employees a certain percentage 
of their earnings in retirement.  Under this construct, because market 
risk is borne by the employer, retirement savings are assured 
irrespective of market performance.  Because of a range of factors, 
these plans have atrophied in recent years.  The concept remains 
sound, however, and can serve as the basis for risk-management 
reform efforts. 
Defined-benefit plans used to be the dominant retirement vehicle.  
But today, seventy-seven percent of private-sector retirement assets 
are held in 401(k)s and the like, while only twenty-three percent are 
in defined-benefit plans—and the trend shows no signs of 
stopping.375  Much has been written about this shift, but in brief, it 
likely stems from dissatisfaction with defined-benefit plans on the 
part of both employers and employees.376  First, consider the 
employer’s perspective.  Many would probably rather not take on the 
responsibility of guaranteeing their employee’s retirement savings.  It 
is not their core business, and companies that take on this burden 
must always be worried about potentially defaulting on the obligation.  
In 2000 and 2001, this fear became especially pronounced as many 
 
374 While it may be theoretically possible to create a self-funded entity to house a 
retirement-guarantee fund, history suggests that the fund would be independent in name 
only.  The self-financed Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, for instance, is severely 
underfunded, but many believe that the federal government implicitly stands behind its 
obligations.  See Jeffrey R. Brown, Guaranteed Trouble: The Economic Effects of the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 177, 185 (2008). 
375 See MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 295, at 2 & tbl.1; Barbara A. Butrica et al., The 
Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and its Potential Impact on the Retirement Income 
of Boomers 1 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College, Working Paper No. 2009-2, 
2009). 
376 See Butrica et al., supra note 375, at 4–5. 
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portfolios were hit by low interest rates and declining equity 
returns.377  Recently adopted accounting rules also make defined-
benefit plans unattractive.  Companies are forced to explicitly 
recognize their portfolio obligations in their corporate financial 
statements.378  As a result, market volatility that affects the value of a 
company’s pension plan could give the impression of broader 
corporate instability when there is nothing volatile about the 
company’s underlying business. 
Employees, perhaps shortsightedly, have likewise been content to 
see these plans fade away.  Full benefits are tied to long job tenures at 
the same company; more recently, this has lost its appeal.379  
Moreover, in the bull markets of the 1980s and 1990s, it likely looked 
to employees as though they could do better if they could simply 
invest their money on their own (in contrast, the last decade of returns 
is one of the worst in the market’s history).380  In addition, defined-
benefit plans suffer from one structural flaw, which is that the benefits 
are linked to the solvency of one’s employer.  Should an employer go 
bankrupt with an underfunded pension, employees may not receive all 
that they were promised (although some savings are guaranteed by the 
government through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation).381  
Likely because defined-benefit plans are laden with such baggage, the 
401(k) structure began to take over. 
The choice between the two retirement templates need not be so 
stark, however.  A few modifications can cure many of the ills of the 
defined-benefit structure without transferring risk completely to 
employees.  In the Netherlands, for instance, defined-benefit plans 
exist not only at the company level but at the occupational and 
industry level as well.382  By sharing pension obligations, the risk of 
underfunding is spread out and, therefore, attenuated.  Moreover, 
providers have developed a flexible mechanism to share underfunding 
 
377 See EDUARD H.M. PONDS & BART VAN RIEL, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, SHARING 
RISK: THE NETHERLANDS’ NEW APPROACH TO PENSIONS 2 (2007). 
378 See Butrica et al., supra note 375, at 4–5. 
379 See id. at 3–4. 
380 See IBBOTSON ASSOCS., supra note 252, at 21–22 & tbl.1-1.  According to Ibbotson, 
“the 17 ½ year period starting in mid-1982 and ending in 1999 comprised a rare span of 
time in which investors quickly accumulated wealth.”  Id. at 22.  In contrast, this past 
decade was the first in which the S&P 500 experienced a negative total return.  Adam 
Shell, How Will the Arrow Point in Ten Years?, USA TODAY, Jan 4, 2010, at 6A. 
381 See ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
AND PRIVATE DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 4 (2008). 
382 See PONDS & VAN RIEL, supra note 377. 
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risk with their employees.  If a risk of underfunding is presented, the 
employers have the power to change how payments are indexed to 
earnings (essentially lowering postretirement payments) or increase 
their contributions.383  Traditional defined-benefit plans, on the other 
hand, provide that accrued benefits cannot be disturbed,384 making it 
more difficult for employers to respond to adverse market 
conditions.385 
Canada has a defined-benefit system that also improves upon the 
traditional structure.  Canadians contribute to a national defined-
benefit plan that is run by a quasi-governmental agency.386  The plan 
commits to provide retirees with a pension corresponding to a certain 
percentage of their preretirement earnings.387  To meet this 
obligation, the government invests in a diversified portfolio,388 and to 
mitigate underfunding risk, the plan has built in flexibility to call for 
increased contributions or announce decreased retirement 
payments.389  The fund is also structured to be as insulated as possible 
from the political forces that could compromise its integrity.390 
The Canadian paradigm seems to trump the employer-centric 
systems.  The government has the power and longevity to better bear 
the risk involved with promising a defined benefit.391  In addition, 
this structure places no arbitrary constraint on freedom of 
employment.  Interestingly, the Canadian plan has a distinctly 
Rawlsian mission statement.  Its goal is “intergenerational equity”—
that each generation contributes “much the same share of earnings 
while working and receive[es] benefits that replace much the same 
share of earnings in retirement . . . .”392 
Such a result certainly seems fair.  Because this setup has the 
potential to provide both reasonable returns and reasonable certainty, 
 
383 See id. at 3. 
384 See id. 
385 See id. at 3–4. 
386 See ASHBY H.B. MONK & STEVEN A. SASS, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, RISK 
POOLING AND THE MARKET CRASH: LESSONS FROM CANADA’S PENSION PLAN 1–2 
(2009). 
387 See id. at 1–2. 
388 See CPP Investment Board, News Release: CPP Fund Up $7.2 Billion to $123.8 
Billion (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.cppib.ca/News_Room/News_Releases/nr_11120901 
.html. 
389 See MONK & SASS, supra note 386, at 3. 
390 See id. at 7. 
391 See id. at 4–5. 
392 Id. at 2. 
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it may very well maximize utility as well.  Given all of this, it is 
worthy of consideration in the United States.393  As with the 
government insurance alternative, the nationalized defined-benefit 
option would likely make the most sense as a mandatory scheme.  
The breadth of such an undertaking and its implications for future 
generations seem to militate in favor of broad societal participation. 
Any of the exogenous risk-management instruments discussed 
above likely represent an improvement over the system we have 
today.  Under our current approach, we leave it to investors either to 
accept the market return or to put together a diversified portfolio that 
better fits their risk preferences.  The problem is that many investors 
likely lack the skills to do so, and even those with investing savvy 
have only limited choices.  The first reform I proposed, where we 
make it easier for investors to more broadly diversify their portfolios, 
would likely help investors better manage risk while keeping an eye 
on returns.  So long as individuals bear risk alone, however, they 
remain at the mercy of market swings.  That is why the latter two 
proposals are worth considering.  It might be fairer, and investors 
might be better off, if we allow individuals to share risk.  Risk sharing 
through insurance or through defined-benefit-type plans may be the 
most effective and efficient way to shield investors from volatility 
without undermining returns. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article presents a new way of looking at securities 
regulation—that is, as an integrated component of a larger societal 
risk-management structure.  This perspective offers to fill a 
fundamental lacuna in the theory of securities regulation and provides 
 
393 The nationalized retirement system described above is similar to Social Security in 
that both aim to provide individuals with a defined benefit in retirement in exchange for 
their contributions.  One difference, however, is that Social Security provides a first tier of 
retirement savings.  The defined-benefit scheme I describe, on the other hand, would be on 
top of Social Security, and is aimed at providing better risk management for the second 
tier of savings, which currently depends on individual accumulation.  Conceivably, an 
expansion of Social Security would accomplish the same purpose.  Social Security, 
however, is a so-called pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system, meaning that the contribution of 
today’s generation pays for the retirement benefits of the currently retired, with the 
expectation that the next generation will return the favor.  Whether PAYGO is a better 
mechanism for providing defined benefits than the self-funded mechanism I describe is a 
subject of much debate.  Because we are already dependent on a PAYGO system for first-
tier savings, however, it makes sense from a diversification perspective to have a funded 
second tier.  See Jayasri Dutta et al., A Portfolio Approach to the Optimal Funding of 
Pensions, 69 ECON. LETTERS 201 passim (2000). 
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a foundation for contemporary policy analysis.  Since its inception, 
scholars have debated about how mandated disclosure protects 
investors, and no truly compelling explanation has been set forth.  
Viewing the regulatory scheme as a shield from market risk, however, 
potentially closes this gap.  This justification fits in with broader 
theories of political philosophy and comports with the theoretical and 
empirical work that inform our modern understanding of the role of 
disclosure in the stock market. 
This perspective also carries policy implications.  I argue that 
under our current system, investors remain ill equipped to handle the 
stock market’s significant volatility and that, therefore, we should 
consider potential reforms.  One possibility is to reform securities 
regulation.  I contend, however, that such efforts would likely bear 
little fruit.  Reforms that are currently on people’s minds, like 
improved disclosure, investor education, and the like, initially look as 
though they would make a positive contribution.  Because the sources 
of market volatility are so deep-seated and varied, however, these 
alternatives likely offer paltry rewards.  I contend that we could bring 
about much more substantive change if we focus on risk-management 
measures that are exogenous to the market.  We could endeavor to 
make portfolio diversification both easier and more effective.  A more 
aggressive alternative, however, would be to abandon the current 
template, in which each individual manages risk alone, in favor of one 
in which risk is shared more broadly across society and generations. 
These conclusions have direct implications for the debate about the 
future of financial regulation that is ongoing in the wake of our recent 
financial collapse.  It suggests that we should not devote our efforts to 
tinkering at the margins of securities regulation, for this will do little 
to help investors.  Rather, we should focus on the often ignored topic 
of risk management.  While there is building support for automatic 
IRAs and expanded savings tax credits, policy makers have yet to 
focus on how to better enable individuals to cope with market risk.394  
Reforms currently under discussion are well-meaning, but because 
they focus merely on expanding savings, they further ingrain cultural 
and societal acceptance of our current suboptimal risk-management 
framework.  The dramatic losses that individuals suffered as a result 
of the stock market freefall in 2008 illustrate the fragility of market 
 
394 See Automatic IRA Act of 2010, H.R. 6099, 111th Cong. (2010) (describing 
legislation introduced in Congress); Ron Lieber, Savings Accounts for All: Simple, but Not 
Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, at B1 (describing President Obama’s similar proposal). 
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holdings and suggest that we need to more broadly reevaluate the 
ideal structure of the relationship between the inherently volatile 
stock market and ordinary investors. 
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